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This study proposes an alternative measure of discretionary accruals that can be 
used in testing for intentional earnings management. Prior research has shown the 
prevalence of measurement error in all models used to estimate discretionary accruals 
(Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991) and modified Jones models (Dechow et 
al., 1995). The alternative measure proposed relies on the premise that managers use one 
or more components of accruals (accounts receivable, inventories, accounts payable, 
other working capital and depreciation) to manipulate bottom-line income in a given 
direction, consistent with their incentives. In other words, components of discretionary 
accruals are expected to be positively correlated. If they are not, this is an indication of 
high measurement error in the models estimating them. The alternative measure is tested 
in terms of its power (type II error) and specification (type I error) and compared to the 
  
traditional discretionary accruals measure. The power of the tests is measured in random 
samples with added accrual manipulation as well as a sample of firms targeted by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for alleged fraud and a sample of firms that 
violated their debt covenants. The results indicate that the power of this alternative 
discretionary measure is higher than that of the traditional discretionary accruals measure. 
The specification (specificity) is tested in random samples chosen from the full sample as 
well as random samples chosen from extreme income and cash from operations 
observations and a sample in which discretionary accruals is a noisy measure of the 
estimated discretionary accruals. The results indicate that the specification of detecting 
earnings management behavior is improved by using the alternative discretionary 
accruals measure.  
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“It is difficult to get a man to understand something 
when his salary depends on his not understanding it.” 
 
Upton Sinclair
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
1.1 Introduction 
Earnings management has become a well-researched topic in the accounting 
literature, especially in recent years after the many accounting scandals in prominent 
companies such as Enron and WorldCom1. These scandals were even a catalyst for the 
passage of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002, which has changed the accounting 
environment tremendously. In the context of the study, earnings management refers to the 
intentional manipulation of accruals in order to maximize the managers’ utility and/or the 
market value of the firm. The next section provides a more detailed definition. Healy 
(1985) was the first to consider earnings management using what he termed 
“discretionary accruals”. These are the accruals that are under the discretion of 
management and are considered a proxy for earnings management behavior. Since then, 
there has been much research using discretionary accruals considering diverse research 
questions. However, modeling techniques to estimate discretionary accruals have not 
improved much since the seminal Jones model (1991), in which a regression-type model 
is used with the change in sales and the level of gross property, plant, and equipment as 
independent variables that explain the non-discretionary level of accruals. Dechow et al. 
(1995) and others have shown that these models estimating discretionary accruals suffer 
from the existence of measurement error that can be significant and may affect the 
research results. The measurement error in these models arises because variables that 
                                                 
1 For example, see: Stewart (2003) and Scott (2002). 
 2
explain non-discretionary accruals have been omitted from the expectation models and so 
wind up on the residual term, which represents discretionary accruals.  
Until now, there has been no formal modeling dealing with the way managers 
manipulate earnings using the various tools under their discretion. This study fills the gap 
in the literature by modeling, albeit simplistically, managers’ decisions to manipulate 
earnings in a specific case. This model shows that managers are expected to manipulate 
one or more components of accruals in the same direction (positive manipulation to 
increase income and negative manipulation to decrease income). Based on this 
expectation, an alternative measure of discretionary accruals is proposed that utilizes the 
information about the consistency between the components of accruals. This alternative 
measure discounts the traditional discretionary accruals measure when components of 
accruals do not behave as expected, thus creating a measure that suffers from less 
measurement error than the current measure. The testable hypotheses of the study relate 
to the improvement in power (type II error) and specificity or specification (type I error) 
of the alternative model in the detection of earnings management behavior. Type II error 
refers to not rejecting the null hypothesis of no earnings management when it is false i.e. 
the ability to detect earnings management when it is in the sample. Type I error refers to 
rejecting the null hypothesis of no earnings management when it is true. 
Section 1.2. presents the literature review related to earning management 
research.  
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1.2 Literature Review 
I begin by defining earnings management (EM), which is not an easy task. There 
are numerous definitions ranging from situations in which earnings is fraudulently 
manipulated to harm investors, to situations in which earnings is manipulated non-
fraudulently to signal to the shareholders the firm’s financial future. The following 
exhibit is extracted from Mulford and Comiskey (2002) and presents some alternative 
definitions of EM.  
 
Defining Earnings Management 
Earnings management is the active manipulation of accounting results for the purpose of 
creating an altered impression of business performance.a 
 
Given that managers can choose accounting policies from a set (e.g. GAAP), it is natural 
to expect that they will choose policies so as to maximize their own utility and/or the 
market value of the firm. This is called earnings management.b 
  
During 1999 we focused on financial reporting problems attributable to earnings 
management by public companies. Abusive earnings management involves the use of 
various forms of gimmickry to distort a company’s true financial performance in order 
to achieve a desired result.c  
aC. Mulford and E. Comiskey, Financial Warnings (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), 
p.360. 
bW. Scott, Financial Accounting Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1997), p.295. 
cSecurities and Exchange Commission, Annual Report (Washington, DC: Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 1999), p.84. 
Exhibit 3.1 as appearing in Charles W. Mulford and Eugene E. Comiskey (2002), p.59. 
 
 4
The first definition does not specify how earnings are managed. In reality, 
managers can choose to manipulate earnings through actual operations such as the timing 
of capital expenditures or asset sales. Alternatively, they can use accrual manipulations, 
which are adjustments made to the accounts. This second type of manipulation is more 
common and is the subject of this study. Also, this first definition does not stipulate 
whether EM is harmful or beneficial to investors. The second definition refers to the 
incentives of managers. They choose accounting policies that maximize their utility 
and/or market value of the firm. This definition indicates that it is important to consider 
managerial incentives that cause the manipulation behavior. The third definition by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the harshest, treating EM as fraudulent 
behavior aimed at distorting the true financial performance of the firm. In the context of 
this study, I refer to earnings management as manipulation in earnings that is designed to 
serve management’s purposes. Whether it is fraudulent is not a consideration. Also, 
whether it is harmful to investors and others is not a consideration.  
Healy (1985) was the first to test for EM in the accounting literature using what is 
termed “discretionary accruals”. In his paper, he tests the bonus-maximizing hypothesis 
of managerial behavior.2 By using actual parameters and definitions of bonus contracts in 
94 sample firms, he finds that accrual policies of managers are linked to income-reporting 
incentives of their bonus contracts, and that changes in accounting procedures by 
managers are linked to adoption or modification of their bonus plan. He proposes 
“discretionary” accruals as a proxy for EM behavior. This discretionary component of 
                                                 
2 The bonus-maximizing hypothesis was first introduced by Watts and Zimmerman (1986). It states that 
managers of firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose accounting procedures that shift reported 
earnings from future periods to the current period under certain conditions. 
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accruals is the component of accruals that is under the discretion of managers. The other 
component of accruals is the “non-discretionary” component, which is the expected level 
of accruals in the firm given no manipulation.  Specifically, accruals can be defined as 
follows: 
TACt = NDACt + DACt 
 
where TACt = Total operating accruals in year t, 
NDACt = Non-discretionary Accruals in year t, and 
DACt = Discretionary Accruals in year t. 
 
The problem is that both components of accruals are not observable so the 
researcher has to make assumptions about one of the components. Healy assumes that the 
discretionary accruals component is the level of accruals in a given year and so 
effectively, he assumes that non-discretionary accruals are zero in expectation. 
DeAngelo (1986) conducts a study of 64 companies whose managers propose to 
go private by purchasing all of the publicly held common stock. She uses discretionary 
accruals to test whether these managers systematically understate earnings in the period 
before the buyouts. The results indicate no such manipulation behavior. The proxy she 
uses for discretionary accruals is the change in total accruals. This effectively sets the 
prior year level of accruals as the expectation of non-discretionary accruals in the current 
year. 
McNichols et al. (1988) examine whether managers manipulate earnings by 
focusing on a specific accrual, the provision for bad debts. They use Generally Accepted 
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Accounting Principles (GAAP) to formulate a model of the expected accrual in the 
absence of EM. The results show that the discretionary component of the provision for 
bad debts is income-decreasing for firms whose earnings are unusually high or low. Even 
though their methodology is more powerful in detecting EM than the previous 
methodology using total accruals, the total accrual approach is preferred because of its 
comprehensiveness. 
Jones (1991) tests EM behavior during import relief investigations by the U.S. 
International Trade Commission (ITC). She finds that discretionary accruals are more 
income-decreasing during the year the ITC completed its investigation than would 
otherwise be expected. She uses a regression-type model to estimate non-discretionary 
accruals in a given year based on the change in economic conditions. Specifically she 
expects that working capital accruals are related to the change in sales and that 
depreciation is related to the level of gross property, plant, and equipment. The model 
used to estimate non-discretionary accruals is as follows: 
t
t
t
t
t
tt
t
A
PPE
A
S
AA
TAC
ebba ++
D
+=
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11
                             (1.1) 
 
where TACt = Total operating accruals in year t, 
At-1 = Total assets at the beginning of year t,  
DSt = Change in sales from year t-1 to year t, and 
PPEt = Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment. 
 
In the previous model, all variables are divided by the beginning level of total 
assets to adjust for heteroscedasticity. 
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The discretionary accrual component is estimated as the difference between total 
accruals and the non-discretionary component using the coefficients from the above 
regression. 
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where a, b1 and b2 are the coefficients estimated in (1.1) and all other variables 
are as previously defined.3 
Dechow et al. (1995) test several models estimating discretionary accruals 
including those discussed above in terms of their power (type II error) and specification 
(type I error). They introduce the modified Jones model in which the change in 
receivables is deducted from change in sales in the estimation model (1.1) to eliminate 
the conjectured tendency of the Jones model to measure discretionary accruals with error 
when discretion is exercised over revenues. They conclude that all models appear well 
specified when applied to a random sample of firm-years with no expectation of EM. 
However, all models generate tests of low power for EM of plausible magnitude (one to 
five percent of assets). All models reject the null hypothesis of no EM at rates exceeding 
the test levels when applied to samples of firms with extreme financial performance. 
Finally, the modified Jones model exhibits the most power in detecting EM. This 
confirms the existence of measurement error in the existing models. 
                                                 
3 Jones uses a time-series specification to estimate regression (1.1) on a firm-by-firm basis. However, 
recently, this regression has been estimated cross-sectionally over industry groups to improve the power of 
the model e.g. Subramanyam (1996). 
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Thomas and Zhang (2000) also test six models of estimating expected accruals for 
forecast accuracy using three different methods and conclude that these models are not 
accurate. They demonstrate that a naïve model that assumes that non-current accruals 
equal -5% of prior year total assets and current accruals equal 0% of prior year total 
assets frequently outperformed these models.  
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) put forward a model to detect EM using the 
balance of accruals rather than the more common change in the accounts used in other 
papers. They discuss accruals related to sales (accounts receivable), accruals related to 
expenses (inventories, other current assets, and current liabilities), and accruals related to 
property, plant and equipment (depreciation). Their model relies on the instrumental 
variable approach and provides stronger results. However, it has not caught on in later 
research as a method of testing for EM. 
The review thus far has alluded to the fact that, to date, the models used to 
estimate discretionary accruals for the purpose of testing for EM suffer from the 
existence of measurement error. This measurement error arises because variables that 
explain non-discretionary accruals have been omitted from the expectation models and so 
wind up on the residual term, which represents discretionary accruals. Following are 
some papers that specifically deal with the measurement error that exists in these models. 
Guay et al. (1996) provide evidence consistent with models estimating non-
discretionary accruals having considerable imprecision or misspecification.  This 
measurement error or imprecision in the model occurs due to the unobservable nature of 
the manipulation and the inadequate job of modeling the non-discretionary accruals. 
McNichols and Wilson (1988) characterize the measurement error and state that “the 
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non-discretionary component can be large in mean and variation relative to the 
discretionary accrual. If so, the proxy will be too noisy to detect EM in situations where it 
exists”. This means that if models estimating non-discretionary accruals are not well 
specified, and omit important variables that are correlated with these non-discretionary 
accruals, then the residual of the model (discretionary accruals) will consist mainly of 
non-discretionary accruals, rendering tests of EM biased.  
As Hansen (1999) notes “models of discretionary accruals are actually of 
expected and unexpected accruals. Therefore, for most earnings management studies, 
unexpected accruals that arise for reasons other than managerial discretion over financial 
reporting represent measurement error in discretionary accruals.” Measurement error in 
discretionary accruals estimates arise because variables that explain non-discretionary 
accruals have been omitted from the expectation model and so wind up on the residual 
term, which represents discretionary accruals.  
Young (1999) states that studies of discretionary accruals activity have generally 
failed to document consistent evidence of EM, e.g. Healy (1985), Gaver et al. (1995), and 
Holthausen et al. (1995) find inconsistent results for management compensation 
contracts. Measurement error in the discretionary accruals estimate is one explanation for 
these inconsistent findings. 
Studies of EM that use aggregate accruals in order to detect earnings do not 
distinguish between the separate components of accruals. Accruals consist of components 
that can behave differently under different economic conditions. If we look at the R2 from 
a modified Jones regression, they are quite low across all industries (as will be shown in 
the empirical section of the study). Given the fact that a manager who wishes to change 
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the bottom-line earnings will probably do so through accrual accounts, as it is the least 
likely to be detected, I propose that it will be beneficial to disaggregate the Jones model 
into its components and look separately at the discretionary accruals of each component. 
When the separate components are considered, this provides the opportunity to consider 
the differential manipulation behavior in these components. The next chapter shows that 
managers’ incentives lead them to manipulate one or more components of accruals in the 
direction that affects bottom-line income consistently. This avoids dilution that occurs 
when components are not consistently managed. Given this expected behavior, the 
discretionary accruals components can be used to infer the presence of measurement error 
in the models that estimate these components. 
The literature provides incentives for managers to engage in EM such as during 
initial public offerings, seasoned equity offerings, and government investigations. Other 
factors that induce EM are the executive’s compensation, and closeness to debt-covenant 
violation. Beneish (2001) provides a good perspective on EM research and the incentives 
for increasing income (e.g. compensation agreements, security equity offerings, insider 
trading, and debt covenants) and incentives for reducing income (e.g. regulation and 
cookie-jar reserves). Some of these situations are used to test for EM using the proposed 
measure developed in this study. These appear in the empirical section in chapter 4.  
 
1.3 Chapter Summary 
Models for detecting EM set forth in the literature concentrate on operating 
accruals as a tool of EM. The Jones model and its later modifications use aggregate 
accruals and their relationship to economic factors (change in sales) and the level of 
 11
property, plant, and equipment to estimate non-discretionary accruals. Review of the 
literature that deals with testing for EM reveals the presence of measurement error in all 
models estimating non-discretionary accruals. This fact provides an avenue for research, 
which is followed in this study. I propose to separately estimate discretionary 
components of accruals (accounts receivable, inventories, accounts payable, other 
working capital, and depreciation) then measure the consistency between them. Any 
inconsistency between the discretionary components is an indication of measurement 
error in the estimation models. The following chapter presents the hypotheses 
development of the study. Chapter 3 presents the sample selection and methodology, 
followed by the empirical results in chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes. 
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Chapter 2: Hypotheses Development  
The purpose of the study is to improve the power and specification of existing 
methods of estimating discretionary accruals. This is done through a measure that takes 
into account the consistency between the components of accruals. This chapter deals with 
the development of this measure. First, the source of bias or measurement error in 
existing models is presented, followed by a detailed description of the existing models 
used in the literature. An optimization model of manipulation by managers is then 
introduced when the manager has two components of accruals that he can choose from to 
manipulate earnings. Finally, the measure of consistency proposed in the study is 
introduced and the testable hypotheses based on this measure are presented. 
 
2.1 Bias in Tests of Earnings Management Using Aggregate Accruals 
Accruals are the differences that are created in the accounting system between 
earnings in a year and cash flow from operations. Operating accruals are calculated as 
follows:4 
tttttt DEPOWCAPINVARTAC +D+D+D+D=  
 
where TACt = Total operating accruals in year t,  
DARt = Increase (Decrease) in accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t, 
DINVt = Increase (Decrease) in inventories from year t-1 to year t, 
DAPt = Decrease (Increase) in accounts payable from year t-1 to year t, 
                                                 
4 Note all liabilities and expenses are the negative of the true values to simplify calculations. This is 
followed in the remainder of the study. 
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DOWCt = Change in other working capital from year t-1 to year t, and 
DEPt = Depreciation expense in year t, 
 
Following Healy (1985), researchers use a measure of discretionary accruals as a 
proxy for EM behavior. Specifically, researchers divide total accruals into a non-
discretionary component (normal level of accruals to maintain the operations) and a 
discretionary component (abnormal level that is under the discretion of managers). 
TACt = NDACt + DACt 
 
where TACt = Total accruals, 
NDACt = Non-discretionary accruals, and 
DACt = Discretionary accruals. 
 
In the measurement of discretionary accruals, researchers use proxies for this 
component of accruals since neither the discretionary nor the non-discretionary 
components are observable. Previous research has shown that the discretionary accruals 
using the Jones method and other methods contain measurement error, which may be 
significant and can bias the research results. McNichols and Wilson (1988) characterize 
the measurement error and show that the coefficient of discretionary accruals on a 
variable, PART (dummy variable that partitions the data into two groups for which EM 
are specified)5 is biased when the partitioning variable, PART, and the measurement error 
                                                 
5 “For example, PART could indicate where earnings are above or below target. PART can be extended to a 
vector without loss of generality” McNichols and Wilson (1988). 
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in the proxy of discretionary accruals are correlated. If discretionary accruals were 
observable then tests of EM could be done using the following regression: 
ebb ++= PARTDAC 10                       (2.1) 
 
In the previous regression, b0 represents the average value of DAC (discretionary 
accruals) when the variable PART is equal to zero, and b0+b1 is the average value of 
DAC when the variable PART equals one (observations in which EM is being tested). 
The researcher rejects the null hypothesis of no EM if the coefficient on the dummy 
variable, b1, has the proper sign and is statistically significant.  
Since true discretionary accruals are not observed, researchers rely on a proxy of 
estimated discretionary accruals, EDAC, which contains measurement error, h. This 
measurement error arises due to poor estimation of non-discretionary accruals: 
h+= DACEDAC  
 
The test of EM using the proxy is then: 
      (2.2) 
 
where 
PART
PART s
s
rbg hh *,11 +=  
 
It is apparent from the above discussion that the bias in the coefficient g1 will be 
affected by the degree of correlation between the partitioning variable and the 
measurement error ( hr ,PART ) as well as the standard deviation of the measurement error 
ngg ++= PARTEDAC 10
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( hs ) and that of the partitioning variable ( PARTs ). The standard deviation of the 
measurement error ( hs ) arises from the poor estimation of the non-discretionary 
accruals. The larger the variance, the more the noise in the residual and so “discretionary 
accruals” contains significant “non-discretionary” components. Even if the correlation 
between PART and h is zero (unbiased coefficient), this can lead to an inflated standard 
error for the estimated coefficient on PART which will increase the probability of a type 
II error.  
The goal of this study is to try to reduce the measurement error inherent in all 
models of discretionary accruals by relying on the information contained in the separate 
components of discretionary accruals. Rather than estimating discretionary accruals 
(DAC) in the aggregate, it is possible to estimate components of accruals separately such 
as accounts receivable, inventories, accounts payable, other working capital, and 
depreciation. The sum of these discretionary components equals the aggregate 
discretionary accruals obtained from one single regression such as the Jones model.  
ttt DAREDAR 1e+= , 
ttt DINVEDINV 2e+= , 
ttt DAPEDAP 3e+= , 
ttt DOWCEDOWC 4e+= , 
ttt DDEPEDDEP 5e+= , 
where tttttt EDDEPEDOWCEDAPEDINVEDAREDAC ++++= . 
 
EDARt = Discretionary Accounts Receivable, 
 16
EDINVt = Discretionary Inventories, 
EDAPt = Discretionary Accounts Payable, 
EDOWCt = Discretionary Other Working Capital, and 
EDDEPt = Discretionary Depreciation. 
 
Noise in the discretionary accruals (EDACt) estimate is reduced when the model 
specification is improved. This is possible when the components are separately modeled 
since the researcher can add whatever variables are related to the specific components. 
The goal is to improve the specification of the model but not reduce the signal (DAC in 
the residual). The EDAC will contain less noise from “non-discretionary accruals” which 
means that the correlation between PART and the measurement error will most likely be 
reduced6 and so the tests are expected to be more powerful (lower type II error) as well as 
more specific (lower type I error). However, this is not the focus of the study. I propose 
that the relationship between the components of discretionary accruals can provide 
insightful information into the prevalence of measurement error in these components. I 
propose a measure that captures the consistency between the components and use this 
measure to provide an alternative discretionary accruals measure that eliminates some of 
the measurement error discussed so far. 
                                                 
6 Since variables that were previously omitted have been included in the model estimating normal accruals, 
the abnormal accruals will contain less of the normal component. This omitted variable problem was the 
cause of the correlation between PART and the measurement error (whether positive or negative).  
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2.2 Models of Discretionary Accruals in the Literature 
This section discusses the most common models that have been used in the 
literature to estimate non-discretionary accruals. They were discussed briefly in the 
literature review. They are presented one more time in this section to explain the source 
of measurement error in each one of them. All these models will be used in this study in 
the empirical section. 
1) Healy model 
In this model, Healy (1985) defines estimated discretionary accruals in a period as 
total accruals scaled by lagged total assets. This implies that non-discretionary accruals 
are expected to be zero.  
            
 
i refers to the firm or the industry depending on whether the analysis is time series 
or cross-sectional. This is the simplest of all the models discussed and is expected to 
contain the highest measurement error since it does not take into account the normal 
operations that would require some level of accruals. Dechow et al. (1995) test the Healy 
model compared to other models but define discretionary accruals as the deviation of 
total accruals in the event period from the mean total accruals during the estimation 
period.  
                                    (2.3) 
 
where EDACit = Estimated discretionary accruals for firm i in year t, 
TACit = Total accruals for firm i in year t,  
Ait-1 = Total assets for firm i at beginning of year t, 
1/ -= ititit ATACEDAC
1/)( -
å
-= it
t
it
itit AN
TAC
TACEDAC
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N = number of years in estimation period. 
The source of measurement error in the Healy model comes from the omitted 
variables in estimating discretionary accruals that are affected by factors in the current 
year. For example, any change in the economic factors in the current year will affect the 
level of accruals without changing the estimate of the discretionary accruals. 
 
2) DeAngelo model 
In this model, DeAngelo (1986) assumes that non-discretionary accruals follow a 
random walk and uses the change in the aggregate accruals from year t-1 to year t to 
represent the discretionary component.  
11 /)( ---= itititit ATACTACEDAC                      (2.4) 
 
where EDACit = Estimated discretionary accruals for firm i in year t, 
TACit = Total accruals for firm i in year t,  
Ait-1 = Total assets for firm i at beginning of year t. 
Similar to the Healy model, the source of measurement error in this model comes 
from omitted variables affecting accruals in the current year. However, this model is 
expected to contain less measurement error than the Healy model if non-discretionary 
accruals follow a random walk. 
 
3) Jones model 
Jones (1991) uses a regression-type model to estimate discretionary accruals. She 
estimates non-discretionary accruals using the following regression: 
TACit /Ait-1= ai1 (1/Ait-1) + b i1 (DREVit/Ait-1) + b i2 (PPEit/Ait-1) + e it           
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where TACit = Total accruals for firm i in year t,  
Ait-1 = Total assets for firm i at beginning of year t, 
DREVit = Change in revenue for firm i from year t-1 to year t, and 
PPEit = Gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t. 
All variables are deflated by beginning total assets to adjust for heteroscedasticity.  
 
The residual from this regression represents discretionary accruals under the Jones 
methodology. 
EDACit = TACit /Ait-1 – [ai1 (1/Ait-1) + bi1 (DREVit/Ait-1) + bi2 (PPEit/Ait-1)]      (2.5) 
 
where the coefficients used are those estimated from the prior least square 
regression.  
The source of measurement error in this model comes from omitted variables not 
captured by sales and the level of PPE such as the change in the credit standing of clients. 
However, it is expected (and shown in Dechow et al., 1995) that this model will capture 
more non-discretionary accruals than the prior two models. 
 
4) Modified Jones model 
The modified version of the Jones model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) 
deducts the change in receivables from the change in revenue to account for manipulation 
to non-cash revenue in the tested period of manipulation. In prior research testing all the 
previous models the modified Jones model exhibited the highest power and specification. 
It is the one with the least measurement error when manipulation occurs through accounts 
receivable (non-cash revenues). 
EDACit = TACit /Ait-1 – [ai1 (1/Ait-1) + bi1 ((DREVit – DARit)/Ait-1) + bi2 (PPEit/Ait-1)]    (2.6) 
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where EDACit = Estimated discretionary accruals for firm i in year t, 
TACit = Total accruals for firm i in year t,  
Ait-1 = Total assets for firm i at beginning of year t, 
DREVit = Change in revenue for firm i from year t-1 to year t, 
DARit = Change in accounts receivable for firm i from year t-1 to year t, and 
PPEit = Gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t. 
 
The above four different models are used to estimate discretionary accruals in the 
empirical section, with the expectation that the Healy and DeAngelo models are 
inherently more misspecified than the Jones and modified Jones models. 
 
2.3 Manager’s Manipulation Decision 
In order to proceed in the study, there has to be some expectation about how 
managers manipulate the different components under their discretion when faced with 
their specific incentives. Watts & Zimmerman (1986) talk about the accounting role in 
contracting, specifically in compensation plan contracts and debt contracts. In regards to 
compensation plans, there are two types of plans that reward management based on 
accounting numbers (usually earnings), which are bonus plans and performance plans. 
Watts & Zimmerman stipulate that if managers controlled the calculation of earnings to 
the extent that they could report any number they wished, then earnings-based bonus 
plans would not exist. However, in practice, these plans do exist and are quite common in 
the remuneration packages of managers. It is true that managers cannot manipulate 
earnings to whatever number they wish but evidence of earnings management exists and 
so the compensation packages are not working as intended in favor of the principal (the 
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investors). There is evidence in the literature that EM is influenced by the compensation 
package. For example, Healy (1985) finds that accrual policies of managers are linked to 
income-reporting incentives of their bonus contracts, and that changes in accounting 
procedures by managers are linked to adoption or modification of their bonus plan. 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2004) provide evidence of the use of discretionary accruals 
to manipulate earnings in firms where the CEO’s potential compensation is more closely 
tied to the value of stock and option holdings.  
In this section, I analyze the manager’s manipulation decision when his earnings-
based compensation plan is based on meeting a specific benchmark such as analyst 
expectations, prior year earnings, or a budgeted level of earnings7. It is expected that 
monitoring and contracting is costly for the principal so not all manipulation will be 
eliminated.  Since there are different components that the manager can use to manipulate 
earnings, I first discuss the costs and benefits of manipulating these different accounts. 
 
2.3.1 Costs and Benefits of Manipulating Components of Accruals 
The next section introduces an optimization model to show how managers 
manipulate different components to maximize their utility. An important consideration in 
the model is what it costs to manipulate the different components of accruals as well as 
what are the benefits from this manipulation. There have not been many papers on the 
subject. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) discuss the costs of manipulating different 
accrual accounts in the context of three EM incentives: seasoned equity offerings, 
                                                 
7 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) document significant discontinuities around zero in earnings, earnings 
changes, and analyst forecast error distributions. This provides evidence that firms manage earnings to 
exceed three thresholds: zero earnings, last period’s earnings, and consensus analysts’ forecasts of earnings. 
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management buyouts, and avoidance of earnings decreases. They divide the costs of EM 
into two categories: 
· Costs of detected EM 
· Costs of undetected EM 
 
Costs that are incurred when EM is detected include market price devaluation, 
loss of managerial reputation, loss of future employment opportunities, or penalties. In 
addition, there are intrinsic costs such as the managers’ dislike of lying. Detection could 
be through SEC enforcement actions, earnings restatements, shareholder litigation, 
qualified audit reports, or negative coverage in the press.  Marquardt et al. state that the 
empirical evidence suggests that EM involving recurring items, specifically revenue 
recognition, increase the probability of detection and are associated with higher negative 
price consequences.8  
Costs of undetected EM include inevitable reversal of manipulation and reduced 
reporting flexibility in firms with bloated balance sheets. In addition, audit costs may be 
higher and perceived earnings quality lower. These costs also are expected to be higher 
for recurring than non-recurring items. 
The costs of manipulation that is detected exceed those from manipulation that 
goes undetected. These costs are expected to increase at an increasing rate since it gets 
easier to detect manipulation when larger (material) amounts are manipulated. Also, 
auditors will be more willing to accept immaterial discrepancies than large material ones. 
The above discussion provides some insights into the costs of manipulation but 
does not show exactly which specific accounts are expected to have high costs and which 
                                                 
8 See Feroz et al. (1991) and Dechow et al. (1996). 
 23
are expected to have low costs. In general, revenue manipulation (and accounts 
receivable manipulation) is expected to have a higher cost of manipulation than other 
types of manipulation.9 The working capital accounts are expected to have the next 
highest costs since they will require faster reversal. Depreciation will probably have the 
lowest cost but it is not very flexible. I expect different industries will have different cost 
functions for the specific accounts. Firms with a larger client base may have lower costs 
when manipulating revenues than firms with a smaller client base, since detection will be 
less probable.  
Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) discuss the benefits of manipulation and propose 
that they depend on the context. They present three contexts namely EM before seasoned-
equity offerings, before management buyouts, and in order to avoid earnings decreases. 
However, they do not discuss the benefits of using a specific accrual. Ertimur et al. 
(2003) investigate investors’ reactions to revenue and expense surprises around earnings 
announcements. They show that investors value more highly a dollar of revenue surprise 
than a dollar of expense surprise. They also show that this differential reaction varies 
systematically between growth and value firms (based on the market-to-book value) and 
depend on the proportion of variable to total costs, the relative persistence of sales and 
expenses, and the proportion of operating to total expenses. I expect that the benefits 
pattern follow the costs pattern closely. Revenue manipulation (and accounts receivables) 
will have the highest benefit from manipulation since it gives the impression of a higher 
level of operations. Other working capital accounts will have the next highest benefit. 
Depreciation manipulation will have the lowest benefit since it is well known that this is 
                                                 
9 Ertimur et al. (2003) argue that accounting manipulation of expenses may be more difficult to detect than 
manipulation of sales. 
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under managerial discretion. In addition, I do not expect that the benefits increase at a 
decreasing rate but rather follow a linear pattern. 
From the above discussion, it appears that the costs of detection of a specific 
accrual will increase with the probability of detection. I propose that the probability of 
detection is related to two factors: 
· The magnitude of the component: 
I expect the probability of detection to be positively related to the magnitude of 
the component used to manipulate earnings. Barton and Simko (2002) show that 
the level of net operating assets (total operating assets less operating liabilities) 
relative to sales is associated with the ability to meet/beat analyst forecasts. 
Specifically, firms that have bloated balance sheets with a large amount of prior 
EM cannot manipulate earnings in the current period. This means that larger 
components may have reached the limit of manipulation and any additional 
manipulation is easily detected. 
 
· The volatility of the component: 
I expect the probability of detection to be positively related to the volatility of the 
component used to manipulate earnings. More volatile components are more 
scrutinized by auditors and require a higher level of verification before the auditor 
signs off on the financial statements. This volatility is captured by the variance of 
the component.  
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In addition, the benefit of manipulation of a specific component is proportional to 
the improvement in market value that results from that particular component. This is 
expected to depend on the following factor: 
· The persistence of the component: 
More persistent components are preferred to less persistent components since they 
give an impression of sustained improvement in earnings.  
 
I expect that there is a trade-off between costs and benefits of components. The 
components of accruals that provide the highest benefit also have the highest cost. The 
above measures are presented in the empirical section. However, it is not directly testable 
whether these above factors are related to the costs and benefits of manipulating specific 
components, and so the results are only suggestive. 
 
2.3.2 Modeling Manipulation with Two Components of Accruals 
Suppose the manager has two choices that can be used to manipulate earnings. 
Denote x1 as the manipulation related to the first variable and x2 as the manipulation 
related to the second variable. For example, x1 could be the amount of accounts 
receivable (and revenue) manipulation while x2 could be the amount of accounts payable 
manipulation. The desired manipulation in any given period depends on the true earnings. 
If earnings fall short of the benchmark that the manager uses then he will have the 
incentive to manipulate earnings to reach this benchmark. The benchmark could be the 
prior period earnings or the level of earnings below which he receives no bonus. Denote 
D as the deviation of true earnings from the benchmark, which represents the targeted 
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manipulation. Denote by b1 and b2 the benefit from x1 and x2, respectively. Without loss 
of generality, assume that b1 > b2. Denote by c1 and c2 the costs associated with x1 and x2, 
respectively. Assume that c1 > c2.  There is a trade-off between the costs and benefits of 
both components. The component that provides the highest benefit from manipulation is 
also associated with the highest cost. 
Furthermore, the manager cannot manipulate earnings at any desired amount. He 
sets a cost threshold for himself. If the costs of manipulation exceed this threshold then 
he will not manipulate beyond that point. This represents his willingness to accept the 
costs created by the manipulation. The threshold changes with the context such as equity 
issuance versus preventing a decrease after a string of earnings increases. Denote this 
threshold by T. 
In the event that the manager cannot manipulate enough to cover the deviation D 
then there will be a shortfall from the benchmark. This shortfall is costly to the manager. 
As the former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt commented in his 1998 speech, there can be a 
tremendous drop in share price associated with even a “one penny” shortfall from 
expectations. Denote by z the shortfall from expectations (the remaining amount that 
cannot be manipulated) and denote by f the cost of this shortfall in the manager’s 
objective function. The manager’s problem can be modeled as follows10: 
Max  fzxbxb -+ 2211           (2.7) 
x1, x2  
s.t.   Txcxc £+ 222
2
11           (2.8) 
  Dzxx =++ 21           (2.9) 
 
                                                 
10 Assuming that managers have a short-horizon, they only care about maximizing current earnings without 
regard to future earnings.  
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The objective function (2.7) is a function of only earnings, which is affected by 
x1, x2, and z. This objective function is consistent with maximization of compensation, 
given that this is a function of earnings. The cost function is represented in (2.8). Notice 
that the cost constraint uses the square values of the x1 and x2 variables to account for the 
fact that costs increase at an increasing rate. The final constraint (2.9) represents the fact 
that the desired manipulation equals the deviation from the benchmark, D. 
The Lagrangian takes the following form: 
][][ 21
2
22
2
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The f.o.c.’s are:  
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       0³z    (3) 
 
       0³l    (4) 
 
with complementary slackness, and finally, 
 
       0>m    (5) 
 
By examining the above f.o.c.’s, (5) need always hold as an equality. The solution 
to the above formulation will depend on the magnitude ofD . When D  is not too large 
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and can be fully manipulated by 1x  and 2x , then z will equal to zero and so (3) will not 
be binding. (1) is always binding i.e. 01 >x . However (2) is not binding at first until a 
certain point.  
When D  is too large to be manipulated z  will take a non-zero value and so the 
f.o.c. (3) holds as an equality. In summary, the solution to the above formulation is: 
 
1) If    then 0,0, 21 === zxDx ; 
 
2) If     and    , then  
 
 
 
 
3) If      , then  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The previous model shows that when the deviation is not too large, the manager 
chooses to manipulate earnings using the choice with the highest benefit even though it is 
costlier, so in (1) the manager chooses to cover the shortfall in earnings by setting Dx =1  
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(manipulation of the first component equal to full deviation from benchmark). When the 
deviation from the benchmark increases, there is a need to manipulate both choices so 
01 >x  and 02 >x . This continues up to a limit when the cost threshold is met and then it 
is not feasible for the manager to manipulate any more. At this point the manager may 
decide to take a “big bath” and create “cookie-jar” reserves to avoid similar situations in 
the future. There is no expectation in this model that one component will be increased 
while the other component is decreased. This makes sense, as that will dilute the total 
effect on earnings.  
Academic research on the subject of manipulating different components of 
accruals includes Plummer and Mest (2001), who examine the distribution of different 
components of earnings and find that firms that manage earnings upwards do so by 
managing sales (and current assets) upwards and managing operating expenses (and 
current liabilities) downwards. Thus it is reasonable to assume that components of 
abnormal accruals will be used simultaneously in the direction that increases, or 
decreases, earnings depending on the incentives of managers.  
If reversal of prior year initiated discretionary accruals occurs during the year, it is 
unlikely that managers will actively manipulate other components to achieve the earnings 
benchmark, especially if the reversal is a large amount. This is true because the cost of 
managing accruals increases at an increasing rate.  
The following exhibit, extracted from Mulford & Comiskey (2002), confirms the 
above results. These are examples of firms that manipulated earnings fraudulently 
through different mechanisms. The firms achieved the desired manipulation through one 
or more component of accruals in the direction that affected earnings consistently. 
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Examples of Abusive Earnings Management 
Company Nature of Abusive Earnings Management 
Advanced Medical Products, 
Inc.                   
AAERa No. 812, Sept. 5, 1996 
· Improperly recognized revenue upon shipments 
to field representatives  
· Improperly held open its accounting periods and 
continued to book sales 
· Recognized sales without shipping the goods 
actually ordered 
· Recognized full sale amount on partial 
shipments 
Cendant Corporation 
AAER No. 1272, June 14, 
2000 
· Both understated reserves and reverses reserves 
into earnings 
· Overstated acquisition-related reserves and then 
reversed portions into earnings 
· Failed to record membership charge-backs and 
cancellations 
· Improperly charged asset write-offs against 
acquisition reserves 
Chambers Development  
AAER No.767, March 5, 1996 
· Improper cost capitalization, especially interest 
capitalization 
First Merchant Accep. Corp. 
AAER No.1166, Sept 28,1999 
· Understated its allowance for credit losses by 
misrepresenting the payment status of accounts 
Hybrid/Ikon Corp. 
AAER No.1281, June29, 2000 
· Improperly recognized as a sale a transaction 
that provided an absolute right of return through side 
letter 
Informix Corp. 
 
· Recognized revenue on transactions with reseller 
customers who were not creditworthy 
· Recognized revenue on disputed claims against 
customers 
· Recognized revenue on transactions granting 
rights to refunds and other concessions 
Intile Designs, Inc. 
AAER No.1259, May23, 2000 
· Underreported value of ending inventory so as to 
decrease property taxes  
Pepsi-Cola P.R. 
AAER No.1171, Sept28, 1999 
· Understated allowances for sales discounts 
System Software Associates, 
Inc. 
AAER No.1285, July 14, 2000 
· Recognized revenue on sales with significant 
uncertainties about customer acceptance of the 
product and collectibility of the contract price and 
significant vendor obligations remained 
aAAER refers to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Release for the indicated date 
Exhibit 3.5 as appearing in Charles W. Mulford and Eugene E. Comiskey (2002), p.67. 
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2.4 Measure of Consistency between Components (RATIO) 
2.4.1 The Case of Two Components of Discretionary Accruals 
Given the previous discussion that managers will use one or more components in 
the same direction to achieve the desired earnings manipulation, a measure that captures 
this effect is devised. This measure is expected to be helpful in eliminating some of the 
measurement error in the aggregate discretionary accruals.  
Suppose as before that there are two discretionary components of accruals 1x  and 
2x , which are linearly related such that 12 axx =  where 0³a .  
The variables 1x  and 2x are normally distributed with zero mean and variance 
2
xs  
and 22 xa s , respectively.  
The researcher does not observe 1x  and 2x  but observes the variables 1y  and 2y  
such that 111 e+= xy  and 212 e+= axy . The error terms represent model 
misspecification in estimating discretionary components. Assume that 1e  and 2e  are 
normally distributed with zero mean and variance 21s  and 
2
2s , respectively.  
Under these assumptions, 1y ~ ),0(
2
1
2 ss +xN  and 2y ~ ),0(
2
2
22 ss +xaN . In 
addition, assume that the error terms are uncorrelated with any of the variables but they 
are correlated with each other with 1221 ),( see =Cov , then 12
2
21 ),( ss += xayyCov . 
Consider the following measure that utilizes the variance of the observed 
components. 
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The variance term 2xs  appears in the numerator and denominator with different 
multiples. When 10 £< a , as was shown in the discussion in the previous section, then 
the multiple in the denominator is more than double that of the numerator and it drops out 
if 0=a .  
This measure is inversely related to the variance of the error terms and positively 
related to the covariance of the error terms. Assuming that the covariance between the 
error terms is negligible11 or does not systematically differ between firms, this measure 
provides information about the magnitude of measurement error in the observed 
discretionary accruals.  Large values of this measure are indicative of low variance in the 
error terms. However, small values of the measure are indicative of high variance in the 
error terms and so the aggregate discretionary accruals are contaminated with high 
uncertainty.  
A disadvantage with this measure is that it uses the variance of the observed 
components, which requires a large number of observations. In addition it will not 
                                                 
11 This assumption was used by Kirschenheiter (1997) in estimating the reliability of accounting signals. 
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pinpoint the year in which the observation is contaminated but will capture the firms that, 
on average, are subject to uncertainty (high measurement error).  
An alternative measure that captures the essence of the above but that can be used 
for each observation individually, whether annual, quarterly, or for some other sub-
period, uses the absolute values of the components. Recall that 2xx = . Given that the 
components of accruals have zero mean, the measure can be modified as follows: 
 
 
 
The measure is the absolute value of the sum of the components of discretionary 
accruals over the sum of their absolute values. This measure is restricted to values 
between zero and one. It tends to zero as the error terms increase and tends to one as the 
error terms decrease.  
In essence this measure captures the signs and magnitudes of the components of 
discretionary accruals. It is high when the components have consistent signs. It is low 
when the components have inconsistent signs and magnitudes. When the discretionary 
accruals measure is represented by one component with a large magnitude and the 
remaining components have small magnitudes then the ratio, R, will still be high even if 
the signs are inconsistent, representing the high magnitude of that particular component.  
The above measure can be easily extended to include more than two components of 
accruals under certain assumptions as shown in the next section. 
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2.4.2 Extension to n Components of Discretionary Accruals  
Suppose that there are n components of accruals 1x , 2x  and 3x ,…., xn which are 
linearly related such that 112 xax =  and 123 xax = , ……, 11xax nn -=  where 0³na
12. 
The sxi '  are normally distributed with zero mean and variance 
22
xia s , given that 
11 =a . 
The researcher does not observe the sxi '  but observes the variables iy  such that: 
 111 e+= xy , 
 2122 e+= xay ,  
. 
. 
. 
 nnn xay e+= 1 .  
 
The error terms represent measurement error in estimating non-discretionary 
accruals. Discretionary accruals with larger measurement error are less reliable and 
discretionary accruals with smaller error are more reliable so the ie ’s represent the 
degree of bias in the measurement of these accruals. Assume that the si 'e  are normally 
distributed with zero mean and variance 2is .  
                                                 
12 This linear correlation could be due to the correlation of all of the components of accruals to a common 
variable such as sales. 
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Under these assumptions, 1y ~ ),0(
2
1
2 ss +xN , 2y ~ ),0(
2
2
22
2 ss +xaN , 
……….. ny ~ ),0(
222
nxnaN ss + . In addition, assume that the error terms are uncorrelated 
with any of the variables but they are correlated with each other with ijjiCov see =),(  
for i,j = 1, 2,…..n. The covariances of the observed components of accruals are then: 
12
2
221 ),( ss += xayyCov , 
13
2
331 ),( ss += xayyCov , 
23
2
3232 ),( ss += xaayyCov , 
. 
.  
ijxjiji aayyCov ss +=
2),(   for ji ¹ , given that 11 =a    
 
Consider the following measure that utilizes the variance of the observed 
components. 
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This measure is inversely related to the variance of the error terms ( si '
2s ) and 
positively related to the covariance between the error terms. Assuming that these 
covariances are negligible, then large values of this measure are indicative of low 
variance in the error terms (low noise). On the other hand, small values of the measure 
are indicative of high variance in the error terms and so accruals are contaminated with 
high uncertainty.  
As before, an alternative measure that captures the essence of the above but that 
can be used for each observation individually, is as follows: 
 
           
  
  (2.10) 
 
 
The measure is the absolute value of the sum of the discretionary components of 
accruals over the sum of their absolute values. This measure is restricted to values 
between zero and one. It tends to zero as the error terms increase and tends to one as the 
error terms decrease.  
In essence this measure captures the signs and magnitudes of the discretionary 
components of accruals. It is high when the components have consistent signs. It is low 
when the components have inconsistent signs and magnitudes. 
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2.4.3 Alternative Measure of Discretionary Accruals 
Since it is impossible to distinguish between what is attributable to true 
discretionary accrual signals and the measurement error or noise from observing 
discretionary accruals, then the relationship between the various components can provide 
useful information that can distinguish between cases with “intentional” EM and cases 
with low likelihood of EM.  
As was established in the last section, using the information from the components 
of the discretionary accruals provides a measure of consistency, RATIO, that is an 
indicator of noise in the aggregate discretionary accruals (the sum of the discretionary 
components).  RATIO is a measure that is, by construction, limited to values between 
zero and one. Since it is inversely related to the variance in the error terms, then as the 
values of RATIO increase (and tend to one) this is an indication of low error variance. As 
values of RATIO decrease (and tend to zero) this is an indication of high error variance. 
The following chart illustrates this concept. 
 
 
 
 
 
The above measure can be used in conjunction with the traditional discretionary 
accruals to provide a measure of EM, which is less noisy. The alternative discretionary 
accruals, CtEDAC  is calculated as follows:  
tt
C
t RATIOEDACEDAC *=          (2.11) 
          Values of RATIO 
   High Noise 
Biased EDAC 
 
   Low Noise 
Unbiased EDAC 
0 1 
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The correction in the above measure is the degree of uncertainty in discretionary 
accruals, given the expectation that components of discretionary accruals are positively 
related. As was shown in the previous section, RATIO is a measure that is inversely 
related to the variance of the error terms or the measurement error in the model 
estimating discretionary accruals. If there is no measurement error in the discretionary 
accruals measure, then RATIO will equal to one and the alternative discretionary accruals 
will equal to the uncorrected discretionary accruals. If, however, there is a high degree of 
measurement error in the discretionary accruals measure then RATIO will be close to zero 
and the alternative discretionary accruals will be discounted towards zero. It is expected 
that this alternative measure will produce more powerful tests of EM (less type II error 
when there exists earnings management) and will be more specific (less type I error when 
there is no earnings management). The following chart illustrates the relationship 
between EDAC and EDACC. 
 
 
 
 
where EDAC = Estimated discretionary accruals measure using the Healy, 
DeAngelo, Jones or modified Jones methods, and 
 EDACC = Estimated alternative discretionary accruals measure using the Healy, 
DeAngelo, Jones or modified Jones methods. 
 
 EDACC = 0    EDACC = EDAC 
Values of EDAC and EDACC 
EDACC < EDAC 
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The following table presents examples of values of EDAC and EDACC when there 
are only two components of discretionary accruals (accounts receivable and accounts 
payable).  
 
Examples of values of EDAC and EDACC: 
 EDAR EDAP RATIO EDAC EDACC 
Example 1 
 
0.06 0.01 1.00 0.07 0.07 
Example 2 
 
-0.09 
 
0.01 0.80 -0.08 -0.06 
Example 3 
 
0.08 -0.03 0.45 0.05 0.02 
Example 4 
 
0.05 -0.01 0.67 0.04 0.03 
Example 5 
 
Example 6 
0.04 
 
0.09 
-0.02 
 
-0.05 
0.33 
 
0.04 
0.02 
 
0.04 
0.01 
 
0.00 
      
Example 7 
 
0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
From the table, several observations can be made: 
Observation 1: Both the mean and standard deviation of EDACC is lower than 
that of EDAC. 
The above observation follows from the fact that RATIO is constrained to take on 
values between zero and one. Essentially, if components of discretionary accruals follow 
the expected pattern (as in example 1 where both components are positive), then the 
aggregate discretionary accruals measure is not adjusted in calculating the alternative 
discretionary accruals, EDACC. However, if the components do not follow the expected 
pattern (examples 2 through 7), then EDAC is discounted towards zero to calculate 
EDACC. Since RATIO cannot be negative, then EDACC will have a smaller variance and 
standard deviation. This observation is confirmed in the empirical section. 
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The smaller mean works against finding EM in samples so if there are significant 
results in testing for EM, this is construed as evidence of EM with greater reliability. 
 
Observation 2: The order of EDAC does not carry over to EDACC. 
The values of EDAC are dependent on the magnitude of RATIO so it is possible 
that large values of EDAC are associated with small values of EDACC and vice versa. 
This can be seen in examples 3 and 4. The value of EDAC is higher in example 2 than in 
example 3 whereas the value of EDACC is smaller. 
 
Observation 3: The difference in magnitude between EDAC and EDACC 
represents the magnitude of RATIO, which is dependent on the magnitude of each of the 
components and their signs. 
If EDAC is dominated by one large component, then RATIO will be high even if 
the relationship between the components is not compatible with intentional EM, e.g. 
example 2. This shows that even if there is inconsistency between the components, this 
will only slightly be apparent in RATIO if there is one large discretionary accrual 
component.  Whether this represents intentional EM or simple misspecification is not 
apparent but the likelihood of misspecification is less when the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals is higher.  
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2.5 Testable Hypotheses of the Study 
In the previous section, I propose an alternative discretionary accruals measure 
that takes into account the degree of consistency between the separate discretionary 
components.  
The correction in the alternative discretionary accruals measure, EDACC, is the 
degree of uncertainty given the expectation that components of discretionary accruals are 
positively related. If there is no measurement error in the discretionary accruals measure, 
then RATIO will equal one and the alternative discretionary accruals will equal to the 
uncorrected discretionary accruals. If, however, there is a high degree of measurement 
error in the discretionary accruals measure then RATIO will be close to zero and the 
alternative discretionary accruals will be discounted towards zero. It is expected that this 
alternative measure will produce more powerful tests of EM (type II error when there 
exists earnings management) and will be more specific (less type I error when there is no 
earnings management). This leads us to the hypotheses of the study stated in the 
alternative form: 
 
H1: The alternative measure of discretionary accruals, EDACC, has more power 
than the traditional discretionary accruals measure, EDAC, in the detection of earnings 
management. 
 
H2: The alternative measure of discretionary accruals, EDACC, is more specific 
than the traditional discretionary accruals measure, EDAC, in the detection of earnings 
management. 
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Furthermore, the improvement in the alternative discretionary accruals will be 
higher when the measure used for uncorrected discretionary accruals contains more 
measurement error, ceteris paribus. Discretionary accruals measured using the Healy and 
DeAngelo models have been shown (Dechow et al., 1995) to contain more measurement 
error than those using the Jones and modified Jones models. This leads us to two sub-
hypotheses of the main hypotheses: 
 
H1a: The improvement in the power of the tests using the alternative measure of 
discretionary accruals, EDACC, is higher when the discretionary accruals measure, 
EDAC, is a noisier signal. 
 
H2a: The improvement in the specification of the tests using the alternative 
measure of discretionary accruals, EDACC, is higher when the discretionary accruals 
measure, EDAC, is a noisier signal. 
 
The discretionary accruals, EDAC, are noisier signals when the model used to 
estimate them is less specified e.g. the Healy and DeAngelo models. I expect that the 
improvement from using EDACC will be less prominent if the models used to estimate 
discretionary accruals are the Jones and modified Jones models, than when the models 
used are the Healy and DeAngelo models. 
These hypotheses are tested in the following two chapters. 
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2.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter explains the motivation and hypotheses of the study. I show that 
managers are expected to manipulate one or more component of accruals and that these 
accruals will change in the direction that affects earnings in the same way. Thus, the 
signs and magnitude of the components of accruals are expected to provide incremental 
information over the magnitude of the aggregate discretionary accruals. Using the 
separate components of discretionary accruals, a measure RATIO is proposed that 
considers the relationship between these components. High values of RATIO are expected 
to be associated with intentional EM whereas low values of RATIO are expected to 
represent misspecification in the discretionary accrual model used.  
An alternative measure of discretionary accruals is proposed (EDACC), which is 
the product of RATIO and the uncorrected or traditional measure of discretionary accruals 
(EDAC using Healy, DeAngelo, Jones and modified Jones models). I expect that the 
EDACC will provide better results than EDAC in terms of the power and specification of 
the detection of EM. Furthermore, I expect the improvement in testing for EM is higher 
when the models used to measure discretionary accruals are noisier models such as the 
Healy and DeAngelo models. 
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Chapter 3: Sample Selection and Methodology 
3.1 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Following Hribar and Collins (2002), I use the cash flow statement data to 
measure total accruals and its components rather than calculate accruals from the balance 
sheet data. I obtain the data from the Standard & Poor’s Compustat database for the years 
1988-2003. I use all active and research firms in the database. The sample is reduced 
when I delete firms with missing observations and extreme values (those in the highest 
and lowest 1% of the distribution) of accruals, earnings (income before extraordinary 
items), cash from operations, change in revenue, gross property, plant, and equipment, 
change in accounts receivable, change in inventory, change in accounts payable, change 
in other working capital, and depreciation. Firms in the financial sector are also 
eliminated (SIC between 6000 and 6999). This results in a total of 46,783 firm-year 
observations. I divide the full sample into industrial groupings based on four-digit SIC 
code classifications with adequate data (³30 observations) to conduct the empirical 
analysis. Table 1 shows the industries used in the empirical work (based on the two-digit 
SIC codes for simplification) and the number of observations in each industry. The 
sample used is broad and encompasses most industries. 
 
((Table 1)) 
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Operating accruals are calculated directly from the cash flow statement as 
follows:13   
TACt = -(DARt + DINVt + DAPt + DTAXt + DOTHt + DEPt)/ At-1 
 
where TACt = Total accruals in year t,  
DARt = Decrease (increase) in accounts receivable (Compustat #302), 
DINVt = Decrease (increase) in inventories (Compustat #303), 
DAPt = Increase (decrease) in accounts payable and accrued liabilities (Compustat 
#304), 
DTAXt = Increase (decrease) in taxes payable (Compustat # 305), 
DOTHt = Net change in other current assets and liabilities (Compustat #307), 
DEPt = Depreciation expense (Compustat #125), and 
At-1 = Lagged total assets (Compustat #6).  
 
The industry subscript has been dropped for simplification. The components of 
accruals used are accounts receivable, inventory, accounts payable, other working capital, 
and depreciation, which are measured as follows: 
1/ -D-=D ttt AARAR    
1/ -D-=D ttt AINVINV  
1/ -D-=D ttt AAPAP  
1/)( -D+D-=D tttt ATAXOTHOWC  
                                                 
13 Hribar and Collins (2002) show that using the balance sheet approach to calculate accruals results in 
numbers that have measurement error that may be high in some cases, especially in periods of structural 
changes. 
 46
1/ --= ttt ADEPDEP  
 
Note that the variables are set up so that asset accounts are represented by positive 
amounts and liability accounts are represented by negative amounts. This enables the 
simple addition of the components to reach total accruals. Table 2, panel A, provides 
descriptive statistics for the full sample of firms for the period 1989-2003. The mean 
income is negative for this period (-0.044). The means of accruals and cash from 
operations are -0.047 and 0.003, respectively. The negative accruals follow from the 
inclusion of depreciation expense. The means of the components of accruals: DAR, DINV, 
DAP, DOWC, and DEP are 0.018, 0.009, -0.013, 0.0006, and -0.061, respectively. 
Depreciation is the largest of the components of accruals with a negative sign. All 
variables are deflated by beginning assets to correct for heteroscedasticity. Panel B 
provides Pearson correlations between some of the variables. This shows that the 
correlation between accruals and cash from operations is negative (-0.078).  
 
((Table 2)) 
 
The methodology used to measure discretionary accruals follows Healy (1985), 
DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. (1995). Using the Healy methodology 
components of discretionary accruals are measured as follows: 
 
 
 
 47
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the DeAngelo methodology, components of accruals are measured as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the Jones methodology while disaggregating accruals into its components is 
achieved through the following five regressions: 
DARt/At-1 = a11 (1/At-1) + b11 (DREVt /At-1) + b21 (PPE/AAt-1) + EDARt 
DINVt/At-1 = a12 (1/At-1) + b12 (DREVt /At-1) + b22 (PPE/AAt-1) + EDINVt 
DAPt/At-1 = a13 (1/At-1) + b13 (DREVt /At-1) + b23 (PPE/AAt-1) + EDAPt 
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DOWCt/At-1 = a14 (1/At-1) + b14 (DREVt /At-1) + b24 (PPE/AAt-1) + EDOWCt 
DEPt/At-1 = a15 (1/At-1) + b15 (DREVt /At-1) + b25 (PPEt/At-1) + EDDEPt 
 
Finally, using the modified Jones model while disaggregating accruals into its 
components is achieved through the following five regressions: 
DARt/At-1 = a11 (1/At-1) + b11 (DREVt-DARt/At-1) + b21 (PPE/AAt-1) + EDARt 
DINVt/At-1 = a12 (1/At-1) + b12 (DREVt-DARt/At-1) + b22 (PPE/AAt-1) + EDINVt 
DAPt/At-1 = a13 (1/At-1) + b13 (DREVt-DARt/At-1) + b23 (PPE/AAt-1) + EDAPt 
DOWCt/At-1 = a14 (1/At-1) + b14 (DREVt-DARt/At-1) + b24 (PPE/AAt-1) + EDOWCt 
DEPt/At-1 = a15 (1/At-1) + b15 (DREVt-DARt/At-1) + b25 (PPEt/At-1) + EDDEPt 
 
where EDAR, EDINV, EDAP, EDOWC, and EDDEP are the proxies used for 
discretionary accounts receivable, inventory, accounts payable, other working capital and 
depreciation, respectively and all other variables are as previously defined. Notice that 
one benefit from disaggregating accruals is that it is possible to use different independent 
variables for each component. This is not attempted in this study since I am interested in 
isolating the benefit of the measure RATIOt, given the current discretionary accruals 
measures. The predicted values from the previous regressions are the non-discretionary 
components, while the residuals from these regressions represent the discretionary 
components. The previous regressions are estimated cross-sectionally across four-digit 
SIC codes for the entire period 1989-2003. The results in tables 2 and 3 are presented 
using the modified Jones method only for convenience.  
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The results of the disaggregated regressions appear in table 3.  
 
((Table 3)) 
 
From examining the coefficients in table 3, we see that DAR, DINV, DAP, are 
more correlated with the proxy for the change in economic condition (change in revenues 
less change in receivables) as expected but the main effect that appears in the total 
accruals regression is diluted since assets and liabilities have similar coefficients but are 
of opposite signs. The regression of DOWC is weak with a mean R2 of 7.8%. DEP has the 
highest explanatory power with a mean R2 of 83.3%. 
The measure RATIOt is calculated from the discretionary components from the 
above regressions. As shown before, RATIOt is the ratio of the absolute value of the sum 
of the discretionary components to the sum of the absolute value of the components. This 
translates to the following given the five components of accruals: 
 
              (3.1) 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variable RATIOt. As shown in the 
previous section RATIOt take on values between zero and one. Its mean in the full sample 
is 0.454. In the absence of any earnings management or measurement error in the proxies 
of abnormal components, the value of RATIOt should equal zero. So the sample contains 
either earnings management or measurement error or both. Panel B presents the 
correlation of RATIOt with other variables.  It is negatively correlated with total accruals 
ttttt
ttttt
t EDDEPEDOWCEDAPEDINVEDAR
EDDEPEDOWCEDAPEDINVEDAR
RATIO
++++
++++
=
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(TACt), earnings (INCt) and cash from operations (CFOt) as well as all components of 
accruals at 1% or less. 
The alternative measure of discretionary accruals, EDACC, takes into account the 
measurement error that is contained in the estimated discretionary accruals, EDAC. It 
discounts EDAC when there is high measurement error (when RATIO is close to zero) 
and leaves EDAC intact when measurement error is low (when RATIO is close to one). 
Panel A of table 2 shows that both EDAC and EDACC have the same mean of –0.004 but 
the alternative measure EDACC has a smaller standard deviation of 0.068 as compared to 
that of EDAC of 0.089. Panel B of table 2 shows that EDACC is less correlated than 
EDAC with TAC, INC, and CFO. This is an improvement on the discretionary accruals 
measure since one of the disadvantages cited in previous work is the high correlation 
between EDAC and CFO and INC, which are used as partitioning variables to test for 
EM. Figure 2 plots the values of EDAC against the values of EDACC.  
 
((Figure 2)) 
 
As we can see from figure 2, the values of EDACC are higher than those of EDAC 
(below the 45 degree line) for negative values of EDAC.  Values of EDACC are lower 
than those of EDAC (above the 45 degree line) for positive values of EDAC. In general, 
EDACC has a tighter distribution than EDAC since the mean is similar but the standard 
deviation is smaller. 
As shown in the previous chapter, managers have under their discretion several 
components of accruals, which they can use to achieve the desired earnings manipulation. 
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The literature proposes that the costs of manipulation are higher for recurring items and 
specifically for revenue manipulation because these types of manipulation have the 
highest likelihood of detection. On the other hand, firms prefer revenue manipulation 
because it provides a better picture of the financial position. This creates a tension for the 
managers, as there is a trade-off between the costs and benefits of manipulating the 
specific components. To confirm this, I investigate the factors that I propose are related to 
the costs and benefits of manipulation, namely: 
· Magnitude of components 
· Volatility of components 
· Persistence of components 
 
I expect the costs of manipulation to be positively related to the magnitude and 
volatility of components whereas I expect the benefits of manipulation to be positively 
related to the persistence of components. Table 4 provides an analysis of the magnitude 
and volatility of the specific components of accruals in the full sample and for the 
different industrial groupings. 
 
((Table 4)) 
 
Panel A presents the mean of each component as an indicator of its magnitude and 
the standard deviation of each component as an indicator of its volatility. These 
descriptives are provided for each two-digit SIC group as well as in the whole sample. 
The results show that there are differences between the industries with respect to the 
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magnitude and volatility of the components of accruals. Depreciation has the largest 
magnitude, considering that it is the only component that is not a difference from year t-1 
to year t. Other than depreciation, accounts receivable has the highest magnitude in both 
the non-durable and durable manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39), the transportation and 
public utilities industry (SIC 40-49), the wholesale trade industry (SIC 50-51) and the 
services industry (SIC 70-89). Inventories have the highest magnitude in the agriculture, 
forestry and fishing industry (SIC 01-09) and the retail trade industry (SIC 52-59). The 
accounts payable component is the highest in the mining and construction industry (SIC 
10-17). In the full sample, accounts receivable have the largest magnitude (in components 
other than depreciation) followed by accounts payable, then inventories, and then other 
working capital. There is a similar pattern with respect to the volatility of the 
components. 
The statistics in panel A do not provide a true picture of the manipulation 
flexibility or the likelihood of detection in different components. It is more important to 
examine the balance of the accrual accounts from the balance sheet. This is provided in 
panel B. The data in panel B confirm what was shown in panel A. Accounts receivable 
have the highest magnitude in most industries (SIC 10-17, 20-29, 20-39, 40-49, 70-89, 
99) followed by inventory levels (SIC 01-09, 20-29, 50-51, 52-59). Other components of 
accruals have a smaller magnitude and volatility. 
In the full sample, accounts receivable has the highest magnitude whereas 
inventories have the highest volatility. 
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Table 5 presents the results of persistence of the components of accruals. The 
persistence is estimated through autocorrelation coefficients estimated from the 
regression of each component of accruals on its lagged counterpart as follows. 
 
111 * -D+=D tt ARbaAR  
122 * -D+=D tt INVbaINV  
 133 * -D+=D tt APbaAP  
144 * -D+=D tt OWCbaOWC  
155 * -+= tt DEPbaDEP  
 
((Table 5)) 
 
The results in table 5 show that the accounts receivable component is significantly 
auto-correlated in all industries except the mining and construction industry (SIC 10-17) 
as well as both durable and non-durable manufacturing industries (SIC 30-49). 
Inventories are highly persistent in all industries except durable manufacturing. The other 
working capital component has a high negative autocorrelation coefficient in most 
industries, which indicates mean reversion. This confirms that the components that are 
the most costly to manipulate provide the least benefit since they are not persistent. These 
tables indicate that there is a trade-off between the costs and benefits of manipulating 
different components of accruals. 
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3.2 Methodology for Hypotheses Testing  
Dechow et al. (1995) test EM by regressing the estimated discretionary accruals 
on a partitioning variable, PART. This variable takes on the value of one if the 
observation is from the event period (in which EM is being tested) and the value of zero 
if the observation is from the estimation period. The regression is as follows: 
EDACt = a + b * PARTt + et           (3.2) 
      
The null hypothesis of no EM is tested by applying a t-test that the coefficient b = 
0 when there is no a priori expectation in the direction of earnings manipulation. The 
coefficient “a” in the regression represents discretionary accruals, EDAC, when the 
variable PART is equal to zero i.e. it is the average level of EDAC. When the variable 
PART equals one, i.e. there is expectation of earnings manipulation, then EDAC equals 
the sum of the coefficients a and b. When there is an expectation of earnings 
manipulation in a certain direction (e.g. income-increasing manipulation) then there is an 
expectation as to the sign of the variable PART (b > 0). Using the alternative measure 
described in this paper, the test of EM is achieved through the following regression: 
C
tEDAC = a1 + b1 * PARTt + e1t                     (3.3) 
 
The results from (3.2) are compared to (3.3) in terms of their R2, the significance 
of the coefficient on PART, as well as their standard errors. The regressions are estimated 
cross-sectionally across four-digit SIC codes. A Z-statistic is calculated using the 
individual t-statistics from these regressions to test the significance of the coefficient on 
PART as follows: 
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where ti = t-statistic for industry i (four-digit SIC code) or firm i, 
ki = Degrees of freedom for regression of industry i or firm i. 
 The Z-statistic is asymptotically distributed unit normal if the t’s are cross-
sectionally independent. 
To directly test the significance of the alternative discretionary accruals measure, 
EDACC, in the power of detecting EM, I employ the following logistic regression: 
PARTt = c + d*Log( EDACt) + f* Log(RATIOt) + et                   (3.4) 
 
Since the alternative discretionary accruals, EDACC, is the result of the 
multiplication of the discretionary accruals, EDAC, and RATIO, the log of EDAC and 
RATIO are used to transform EDACC from the multiplication format into the addition 
format to directly test the improvement from using EDACC. The above regression uses 
PART, a binary variable, as the dependent variable and so the least square method cannot 
be used.   
Testing for earnings management is performed mainly in six different samples:  
(1) Randomly selected samples of 1000 firm-years in which a fixed and 
known amount of accrual manipulation has been artificially introduced, 
(2) A sample of firms that were targeted by the SEC for alleged accounting 
fraud, 
(3) A sample of firms that have violated their debt covenants, 
(4) Randomly selected samples of 1000 firm-years from the full sample, 
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(5) Randomly selected samples from sub-samples of extreme earnings and 
cash from operations performance. 
(6) Randomly selected sample of 1000 firm-years in which noise has been 
introduced. 
 
The first three samples are used to test the power of the measure CtEDAC . Since 
these samples contain manipulation, CtEDAC  is expected to detect EM better than the 
uncorrected tEDAC . In the context of EM, the power of the tests is more important than 
the specification since it is of paramount importance to discover manipulation behavior 
when it occurs. However, if manipulation is suspected, further tests can be made to be 
sure that actual EM has occurred and thus reduce the type I error. 
The first random sample of 1000 firm-year observations is selected from the 
46,783 firm-year observations in the full sample that have positive EDAC (using the 
modified Jones method) to alleviate the dilution that can occur in the observations that 
have negative EDAC when manipulated with positive amounts. The random selection 
process is done without replacement. After the selection process, these 1000 observations 
are assigned a value of one for the variable PART. The variable PART is assigned the 
value of zero for the remaining firm-year observations. Once the firm-year is chosen, I 
artificially add accrual manipulation to these observations. The amount of manipulation I 
add is 5%, 10%, and 20% of total assets. These amounts seem reasonable since Jones 
(1991) reports mean abnormal accruals of 6% of total assets ranging from 0.6% to 16.1% 
(however, it was negative in her paper since her sample was chosen with incentives for 
income-decreasing management). Also, Dechow et al. reported that all discretionary 
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accruals models were not powerful enough to detect manipulation of economically 
plausible magnitudes (1% to 5% of total assets). I assume that full reversal of the 
discretionary accruals occurs within one year. In the event year, I add the same amount of 
manipulation to accounts receivable and revenue, with the remaining manipulation in 
accounts payable. For example, in the 5% manipulation case, 2% manipulation is added 
to accounts receivables and revenues, while 3% is added to accounts payable. This 
manipulation effectively adds 0.02 to accounts receivable and 0.03 to accounts payable 
since they are deflated by lagged assets. In the 10% manipulation scenario, I add 5% 
manipulation to accounts receivable and 5% to accounts payable. Finally, in the 20% 
manipulation scenario, I add 16% to accounts receivable and 4% to accounts payable. 
The relative manipulation in the components is changed in each scenario to assess the 
incremental usefulness of the alternative discretionary accruals measure under different 
assumptions. 
Another way to test the power of the models detecting EM is to look at firms that 
were subject to litigation by the SEC. 142 firms were identified from the Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER’s) made by the SEC during the years 2000-2004 
(up till October 2004). Table 6 presents the specific manipulation that these firms made 
as alleged by the SEC. Nine observations were dropped because the allegation by the 
SEC did not include manipulation in any accrual account.  
 
((Table 6)) 
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The table shows that about 34% of the sample (45 firms out of total 133 firms) 
had manipulation in more than one component of accruals. Out of these, 39 firms had 
manipulation of revenue (accounts receivable) in addition to some other components, 
whereas only 6 firms manipulated components other than revenue. The remaining 66% of 
the sample (88 firms) manipulated only one component, with the bulk (56 firms) 
manipulating revenues only. 
Out of this sample, there were 10 firms that had no Cusip number identified from 
the Compustat Active and Research firms so they were dropped. A further 104 firms 
were dropped due to insufficient data on the Compustat database. The final sample 
consists of 19 firms (249 firm-year observations). The sample is small and so the results 
may not be strong. The AAER’s identified the years in which these firms had allegedly 
inflated earnings and so these years are used as the test years in which the PART variable 
is assigned the value of one. These firms allegedly inflated earnings over periods ranging 
from 1 year to 5 years and most were in the later years 2000-2001.  
The third sample relies on positive accounting theory, which predicts that firms 
approaching debt covenant violation will make income-increasing accounting choices to 
loosen their debt constraints (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
1994). The literature has presented inconsistent results when tackling this issue. For 
example, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) show that in the year prior to debt covenant 
violation, discretionary accruals are significantly income-increasing, whereas in the year 
of violation, they show only evidence of income-increasing discretionary working capital 
accruals, after controlling for management changes and auditor going concern 
qualifications. Jaggi and Lee (2002) show that managers of financially distressed firms 
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use income-increasing discretionary accruals if they are able to obtain waivers for debt 
covenant violations, and use income-decreasing discretionary accruals if debt 
restructuring takes place or debts are renegotiated because waivers are denied. I obtain a 
sample of firms that have violated their debt covenants directly from the Lexis-Nexis 
database (Disclosure Reports in year 2005). This results in a sample of 67 firms. I check 
all existing annual reports (10K) that are available on the EDGAR database to see if these 
firms had any more periods of violations. This results in 137 firm-year observations of 
debt covenant violations. I consider the year prior to violation a violation period also to 
test for manipulation made in that period. This results in a sample of 141 firm-year 
observations. Matching these observations with the available data on Compustat results in 
a sample of 161 firm-year observations (69 firm-year observations in which there was 
violation).14 This sample is used to test the differences between discretionary accruals in 
the violation period vs. the non-violation period using the same regressions discussed 
above. 
The specificity or specification of the discretionary accruals measure is tested in 
the last three samples. Since there is no expectation of EM in the fourth sample then the 
variable PART should be insignificant and the null hypothesis of no EM should not be 
rejected. The specification of the models is measured by the rejection rates of the null 
hypothesis of no EM in this sample. The sample used is a random sample selected as in 
(1) but with no artificially added accrual manipulation.  
Sample five uses random samples chosen from observations that are in the highest 
and lowest deciles of cash from operations and income. These observations represent 
firm-years that are experiencing extreme financial performance. This sampling method is 
                                                 
14 Firms that have less than 5 observations in non-violation periods are deleted. 
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meant to test the specification of the models when the variable PART is correlated with 
firm performance since the EM stimulus in many existing studies are correlated with firm 
performance.  
The final sample is a random sample chosen as in (5) form the highest and lowest 
decile of income. However, once the sample of 1000 observations is chosen, I replace the 
discretionary accrual estimates (for the components) with random numbers drawn from a 
normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation as the vector of modified 
Jones model estimates. This approach was used in Elgers et al. (2003) to test for 
measurement error. This effectively creates a noisy measure of discretionary accruals. 
The rejection rates using EDAC and EDACC are compared. 
 
3.3 Chapter Summary  
This chapter explains the methodology used to test the power and specification of 
the measures of discretionary accruals in the next chapter. Three samples are chosen to 
test the power of the discretionary accruals measures: a random sample with added 
accrual manipulation, a sample of firms targeted by the SEC for alleged fraud, and a 
sample of firms that violated their debt covenants. 
Three samples are used to test the specification of the measures of discretionary 
accruals: a random sample with no expectation of EM, random samples chosen from 
extreme income and cash from operations sub-samples, and a random sample with added 
noise. 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Results 
4.1 Testing Power of Discretionary Accruals Models 
The power of the tests refers to type II error. This type of error occurs when the 
null hypothesis of no EM is not rejected when it is false. This means that the sample 
contains actual EM but the models are not powerful enough to detect this. This is tested 
in a random sample in which I add accrual manipulation as well as a sample of firms that 
were targeted by the SEC for income-increasing manipulation and a sample of firms that 
violated their debt covenants. The following regressions are used to test the power of the 
discretionary accruals measure, EDACt, against the alternative discretionary accruals 
measure, CtEDAC . 
EDACt = a + b * PARTt + et                                     (4.1) 
C
tEDAC = a1 + b1 * PARTt + e1t                     (4.2) 
PARTt = c + d*Log( EDACt) + f* Log(RATIOt) + et        (4.3) 
 
4.1.1 Random Sample with Added Accrual Manipulation 
Hypothesis 1 of the study states that the power of EDACC will be higher than that 
of EDAC. This is tested first in a random sample with artificially added accrual 
manipulation. 
Table 7 provides the results of the above regressions (4.1) and (4.2) using EDAC 
and EDACC as the dependent variable in the first sample. The added accrual manipulation 
used is 5%, 10%, and 20% of total assets. The regressions are estimated across four-digit 
SIC codes. The results presented are the means and standard deviation of the coefficients 
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and t-values from these regressions. EDAC and EDACC are calculated using the Healy, 
DeAngelo, Jones, and modified Jones methodology.  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that using EDACC as the dependent variable will improve 
the power of the tests. This means that the t-values of the PART variable will be higher 
and the R2 of the regressions will be higher when using EDACC.  
Hypothesis 1a predicts that this improvement will be higher when the signal 
EDAC is noisier. The Healy and DeAngelo models have been shown to contain more 
measurement error than the Jones and modified Jones model and so the improvement is 
expected to be higher for these two models. 
 
((Table 7)) 
 
From inspection of the results in table 7, we see that the power of all models is 
improved when using EDACC. The t-values of the PART variable increase and the 
coefficients on PART are closer to the actual manipulation using EDACC. The 
manipulation in the table is 5% (2% to DAR and 3% to DAP), 10% (5% to DAR and 5% to 
DAP) and 20% (16% to DAR and 4% to DAP). The improvement in the results is higher 
when the amount of manipulation is higher. So hypothesis 1 of the paper is accepted.  
Hypothesis 1a predicts that the improvement in the power of the tests will be 
higher when the Healy and DeAngelo models are used. There is some evidence of this, 
especially under the 20% manipulation. For example, the z-statistic under the 20% 
manipulation (average t-statistic for all four-digit code regressions) increases by 8.52 
using the Healy method and 8.82 using the DeAngelo method, whereas the increase is 
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only 4.62 using the Jones method and 4.89 using the modified Jones method. The same 
pattern holds when comparing the mean R2 from these regressions. These R2’s under the 
20% manipulation increase by 2.33% using the Healy method and 2.52% using the 
DeAngelo method, whereas the increase is only 1.39% using the Jones method and 
1.45% using the modified Jones method. Examination of the standard errors of all 
regressions reveal that these are lower using EDACC than when using EDAC, which is the 
reason for the improved power of the models. 
To directly test the significance of EDACC I employ the logistic regression in 
(4.3). This directly tests the significance of EDACC by testing the significance of 
Log(RATIO). If the coefficient on Log(RATIO) is significant even in the presence of 
Log(EDAC) then there is a significant improvement in the power of the model from using 
EDACC. Panel B of table 7 presents the results from regression (4.3) using the modified 
Jones method. Both Log(EDAC) and Log(RATIO) are significant at less than 1% for all 
amounts of manipulation. 
 
4.1.2 SEC Litigation Sample 
The second sample used to test the power of the models is the sample of firms that 
were targeted by the SEC for alleged accounting fraud. The sample consists of 19 firms 
(249 observations). The regressions (4.1) and (4.2) are estimated on a firm-by-firm basis 
rather than by SIC codes. Table 8 presents the results of these regressions (mean and 
standard deviation of coefficients and t-values). From examining the Z-statistics, we see 
that EDACC is an improvement using all methods to estimate discretionary accruals. 
Under the modified Jones method, the Z-statistic becomes significant at the 1% level 
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using EDACC (2.454) although it is not significant when using EDAC (1.950). The 
standard errors are lower when using EDACC for all discretionary accruals models and 
the R2 from these regressions are higher (except when using the DeAngelo method). 
Hypothesis 1 is thus accepted. However, there is no support for hypothesis 1a. 
 
((Table 8)) 
 
Panel B provides the results of the logistic regression with Log(EDAC) and 
Log(RATIO) as the independent variables. Even though Log(EDAC) is not significant, the 
variable Log(RATIO) is significant at less than 5%, which corroborates the improvement 
in the power of the model using EDACC. This regression is provided only using the 
modified Jones method. 
 
4.1.3 Debt-Covenant Violation Sample 
Positive accounting theory predicts that firms approaching debt covenant 
violation will make income-increasing accounting choices to loosen their debt constraints 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). The literature has 
presented inconsistent results when tackling this issue. For example, DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) show that in the year prior to debt covenant violation, discretionary 
accruals are significantly income-increasing, whereas in the year of violation, they show 
only evidence of income-increasing discretionary working capital accruals, after 
controlling for management changes and auditor going concern qualifications. Jaggi and 
Lee (2002) show that managers of financially distressed firms use income-increasing 
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discretionary accruals if they are able to obtain waivers for debt covenant violations, and 
use income-decreasing discretionary accruals if debt restructuring takes place or debts are 
renegotiated because waivers are denied.   
Empirical results for the sample of firms that violated their debt covenants are 
presented in table 9. In the regressions (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3), the variable PART is set to 1 
in the period of violation and the prior year of violation (year 0 and –1) and set to 0 in the 
remaining periods. The regressions are on a firm-by-firm basis as in the SEC litigation 
sample. 
 
((Table 9)) 
 
Panel A of table 9 presents the results of (4.2) and (4.3) using the Healy, 
DeAngelo, Jones and modified Jones models to estimate discretionary accruals. The 
results provide some evidence of income-decreasing EM in the year of covenant 
violation. PART has a negative coefficient using all models. However, these coefficients 
are mostly insignificant at conventional test level (probably due to the small sample size). 
There appears to be only an improvement when using EDACC using the modified Jones 
model. There is also an increase in the R2 of the regressions when using the Jones and 
modified Jones models.  
Panel B of table 9 presents the results from regression (4.3). This provides 
evidence of the incremental significance of EDACC over EDAC. The sample is smaller 
since the log of negative numbers is not defined. The results indicate that even though 
EDAC is not significantly different between violation and non-violation periods, EDACC 
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is incrementally significant since the coefficient on RATIO is significant at the 10% level. 
This provides direct supporting evidence of the usefulness of considering the interaction 
between the discretionary components of accruals when using the modified Jones model.  
The analysis was repeated with PART equaling 1 in the period of violation alone 
(Year 0), and 0 otherwise. There were no significant results using either EDAC or 
EDACC. 
To further test for the usefulness of RATIO in this sample, a 2X2 frequency table 
is provided in which the actual and expected frequency of observations with values of 
RATIO above (or equal to) and below the median in periods of violation and non-
violation are compared. The median value of RATIO is calculated for each firm in all 
periods excluding year 0 and –1.  
 
((Table 10)) 
 
The two-way test statistics performed test the null hypothesis of no association 
between the row variable and the column variable. When the sample size n is large, these 
test statistics are distributed approximately as Chi-square when the null hypothesis is 
true. When the sample size is not large, exact tests may be useful. The results indicate 
that the actual frequency of observations in violation periods that are above the median 
exceed expectation (29 vs. 23.21) whereas the actual frequency of observations in non-
violation periods that are below the median exceed expectation (55 vs. 49.21). Using 
Fisher’s exact test, the Chi square value of the table is 4.460, which indicates the null 
hypothesis of no association between the rows and columns is rejected at the 5% test 
 67
level. This table shows that the components of discretionary accruals are consistent in 
periods of no-violation (RATIO > median). 
The results in tables 7 through 10 confirm the improvement of the alternative 
measure of discretionary accruals, EDACC, to the power of all models. The next section 
discusses the specification or specificity of the models. 
 
4.2 Testing Specification of Discretionary Accruals Models 
The specification of the models is harder to test since all models are expected to 
return insignificant results. Specification, also referred to as specificity, relates to type I 
error, which means the null hypothesis of no EM is rejected in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis when the null is true. This is tested in several ways. First, a random sample is 
chosen in the same manner as above. Since this is a random sample from the whole 
population, there is no expectation of EM in either direction and the null should not be 
rejected.  
 
4.2.1 Random Sample 
Following Dechow et al. (1995), I test specification by calculating the rejection 
rates of regressions (4.1) and (4.2) in random samples chosen in the same manner as 
above (in 4.1.1) but with no artificially added manipulation.  
Table 11 presents the results in the random samples from the regressions 
estimated over the four-digit SIC codes. Ten different iterations are estimated and the 
mean and median values of the rejection rates are presented. The rejection rates are given 
separately for significance of the PART coefficient at the 1% and 5% levels for one-tailed 
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tests (Coefficient > 0 and coefficient < 0). No pattern emerges from the rejection rates. 
All models tested are similar in their rejection rates using EDAC and EDACC as the 
dependent variables. All models appear well specified as reported in Dechow et al. 
whether using EDAC or EDACC.  
 
((Table 11)) 
 
4.2.2 Extreme Performance Samples 
Tables 12 and 13 provide rejection rates of regressions (4.2) and (4.3) in samples 
chosen in the highest and lowest deciles of income and cash from operations, 
respectively. These sub-samples represent extreme earnings and cash from operations 
performance. Panel A of table 12 provides results for the sample chosen from the lowest 
decile of income.  
 
((Table 12)) 
 
The results document the same pattern as in Dechow et al. All models tend to 
reject the null hypothesis of no EM against the alternative hypothesis that EM is income-
decreasing (i.e. actual rejection rates are higher than the expected rejection rates in a 
random sample at the conventional test levels of 1% and 5% when the alternative 
hypothesis is that EM < 0). This result occurs because observations with low earnings 
tend to have low accruals and all the models attribute this to negative discretionary 
accruals. The improvement in specification from using EDACC is only slight (ranging 
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from 0.94% reduction in mean rejection rates using the Healy method to 2.56% using the 
Jones method) when the test level is 5%, except when using the DeAngelo method. 
Reduction in rejection rates is less prominent at the 1% test level and there is even a 
0.53% increase in rejection rates using the modified Jones method. 
Panel B provides the results for the sample chosen from the highest decile of 
income. The pattern is opposite to the results in Panel A. Here, the rejection rates tend to 
exceed the test levels when the alternative hypothesis tested is that EM is income-
increasing. The improvement from using EDACC ranges from 0.05% reduction in mean 
rejection rates using the DeAngelo method to 3.48% using the Healy method at the 5% 
level. There is only improvement when using the Healy method (2.25% reduction in 
mean rejection rates) and when using the modified Jones method (0.24% reduction in 
mean rejection rates) at the 1% test level. 
Table 13 provides the results for the samples chosen from the highest and lowest 
deciles of cash from operations. The pattern of rejection rates are expected to be opposite 
to that using the extreme income samples since there is a negative correlation between 
cash flow and accruals.  
 
((Table 13)) 
 
Panel A presents the results in the lowest decile of cash from operations. The 
alternative hypothesis of income-increasing EM tends to be rejected more often than the 
alternative of income-decreasing EM, even though the rejection rates are similar. EDACC 
shows improvement in specification, ranging from 1.22% reduction in mean rejection 
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rates using the DeAngelo method to 2.04% using the Jones method at the 5%, and 
ranging from about 0.21% reduction in mean rejection rates using the DeAngelo method 
to 1.31% using the Healy method at the 1% test level for the alternative hypothesis of 
positive EM. There is less significant improvement for the alternative hypothesis of 
negative EM. 
Panel B presents the results in the highest decile of cash from operations. The 
alternative hypothesis of income-decreasing EM tends to be rejected more frequently 
than the alternative hypothesis of income-increasing EM. EDACC shows improvement at 
the 5% level using the all methods except DeAngelo (ranging from 2.44% reduction in 
mean rejection rates using the Jones method to 2.88% using the modified Jones method). 
The results of the specification of the models using EDAC and EDACC are mixed. 
However, there is not much improvement using the alternative measure of discretionary 
accruals. These results could be attributed to the sampling procedure. The extreme 
performance samples may contain a higher incidence of observations that truly are 
managing earnings and so in reality the rejection rates do not represent type I errors. 
Also, empirically, the improvement in testing for EM using EDACC may not be 
significant in homogeneous groups. The specification tests were conducted on 
homogenous groups with extreme performance. In this case, RATIO may not be able to 
extract the noise from the discretionary accruals measure. The benefit from using the 
alternative discretionary accruals is expected to be higher in heterogeneous samples.  
This creates a problem in testing for specification issues. In the next section, I create a 
noisy signal of discretionary accruals to test the improvement in specification using 
EDACC. In section 4.2.4., I provide some determinants of measurement error in 
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discretionary accruals and relate them to both EDAC and EDACC to show that there is a 
reduction in measurement error when EDACC is used. 
 
4.2.3 Noise Sample 
To further test the specification of the alternative discretionary accruals measure, I 
calculate the rejection rates of regressions (4.1) and (4.2) in a random sample compared 
to a random sample that has artificial discretionary accruals. I choose a random sample 
from extreme income deciles then replace the discretionary accruals components with 
random numbers drawn from a normal distribution with the same mean and standard 
deviation as the vector of modified Jones model estimates. This effectively creates a 
noisy measure of discretionary accruals. The results appear in table 14. 
 
((Table 14)) 
 
The first portion of the table presents the results from the samples chosen from the 
lowest decile of income. As seen in the previous section all models tend to reject the null 
hypothesis of no EM against the alternative hypothesis of negative or income-decreasing 
manipulation. This is because the discretionary accruals tend to associate low levels of 
accruals (in low income deciles) with income-decreasing manipulation. In the random 
sample, the alternative discretionary accruals measure shows some improvement in the 
rejection rates at both the 1% and 5% test levels. The noise sample is the same random 
sample with replaced discretionary accruals. The rejection rates are similar to those in the 
random sample with unchanged discretionary accruals. The alternative discretionary 
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accruals measure, EDACC, is able to reduce rejection rates by over 5% at the 5% test 
level and over 2% at the 1% test level. These are quite significant numbers when dealing 
with large samples. 
The second portion of the table deals with rejection results in samples chosen 
from the highest decile of income. All models tend to reject the null hypothesis of no EM 
against the alternative of positive or income-increasing manipulation. This is because the 
models tend to associate high levels of accruals (present in high income deciles) with 
income-increasing manipulation. In the random sample, EDACC shows some 
improvement in rejection rates as compared to EDAC. In the noise sample, the rejection 
rates show only slight improvement when using EDACC at the 5% test level. Collectively, 
these results indicate that there is some improvement in specification from using EDACC.  
However, there is no support for the improvement in specification using the Healy and 
DeAngelo methods compared to the Jones and modified Jones methods. Hypothesis 2a is 
thus rejected. 
 
4.2.4 Determinants of Measurement Error 
To further test whether EDACC reduces the measurement error contained in 
EDAC, I follow the analysis in Young (1999). Young quantifies the measurement error in 
alternative models of discretionary accruals and presents four possible determinants of 
the non-discretionary component in the discretionary accruals measures. These 
determinants are: 
(i) Cash flow performance: Failure to adequately control for the association 
between accruals and cash flow when estimating discretionary accruals will cause part of 
 73
the positive non-discretionary accruals associated with extreme negative cash flows to be 
incorrectly attributed to income-increasing manipulation, 
(ii) Growth rate: Growth firms tend to experience large increases in working 
capital accounts while the opposite is true for firms in decline. Failure to control for this 
relation will cause part of the positive non-discretionary accruals associated with high 
growth to be incorrectly attributed to income-increasing manipulation, 
(iii) Fixed asset intensity: Even in the absence of earnings management, firms 
with a large asset base tend to have large depreciation expenses. The magnitude of the 
depreciation accrual is expected to be positively associated with fixed asset intensity. 
(iv) Fixed asset life: The magnitude of the depreciation accrual is expected to 
be negatively associated with average fixed asset life.  
 
The following regressions are used to test the presence of measurement error in 
models of discretionary accruals: 
EDACt = a + b*CFOt + c*Growtht + d*Intensityt + e*Lifet + e t      (4.4) 
C
tEDAC  = a1 + b1*CFOt + c1*Growtht + d1*Intensityt + e1*Lifet + e1t     (4.5) 
 
where CFOt = Cash from operations in year t, 
Growtht = REVt – REVt-1 / REVt-1, 
Intensityt = Net PPEt / At, and 
Lifet = Gross PPEt / DEPt. 
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The presence of measurement error in the discretionary accruals measures is 
established from the significance of the coefficients in the above regressions. Table 15 
presents the results from the above regressions estimated over four-digit SIC codes.  
 
((Table 15)) 
 
From inspection of the R2 of all regressions using EDAC, the model with most 
measurement error captured in the discretionary accruals measure is the Healy model 
with an R2 of 31.85%. The modified Jones and Jones models follow closely while the 
DeAngelo surprisingly has the lowest R2 of 13.99%. Using EDACC provides slight 
improvement in all models with the largest improvement using the Healy model 
(Reduction of 4.75% in R2). The t-values using EDACC are also smaller than when using 
EDAC as the dependent variable. This analysis supports the assertion that the alternative 
measure of discretionary accruals alleviates some of the measurement error present in the 
discretionary accruals measures. 
 
4.2.5 Further analysis 
To further test the specification of the alternative discretionary accruals and 
whether it is able to reduce the measurement error, I follow the methodology in Elgers et 
al. (2003). Their analysis reassesses the evidence of anticipatory income smoothing 
reported in DeFond and Park (1997). They show that the methodology followed by 
DeFond and Park, in which they use unmanaged earnings calculated as income less the 
discretionary portion estimated, provides identical results when a random assignment of 
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discretionary accruals to firm-year observations is used in place of the actual 
discretionary accruals numbers. This means that the results in DeFond and Park are 
representative of measurement error in the discretionary accruals measure. 
I use the I/B/E/S Summary History Data to obtain the consensus analysts’ forecast 
of earnings in year t+1 as of March (and the first 10 days of April) of year t+1 for all 
December fiscal year firms. I assume these forecasts are management’s expectation of 
future period unmanaged earnings as of the time they are making their discretionary 
accruals decision for year t. In each year, “unmanaged earnings” are calculated as 
earnings before extraordinary items less estimated discretionary accruals. Unmanaged 
earnings are then are classified as “good” or “poor” relative to the two-digit SIC code 
industry median unmanaged earnings. The resulting sample is 7,796 observations that 
have forecasts of future earnings. 
Future earnings are also coded as “good” or “poor” relative to the two-digit SIC 
code industry median forecasted earnings. The above classification results in four 
samples that appear in table 16. Panel A contains the analysis that uses EDAC to estimate 
unmanaged earnings, while Panel B presents the results using EDACC. I focus on groups 
(ii) and (iii) in table 16. Group (ii) represents the group that has “good” current earnings 
performance (unmanaged earnings higher than the industry median) but “poor” expected 
earnings performance in the next year (income forecast less than the industry median). In 
this case, DeFond and Park postulate that the manager will extend some of the current 
good earnings performance in year t to the next year t+1 by using negative income-
decreasing accruals. Thus I expect that the mean discretionary accruals will be negative 
in that sub-sample. Group (iii) represents the group that has “poor” current performance 
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but “good” future performance. In this case, the manager is expected to borrow some of 
the good performance from next year and so I expect that discretionary accruals are 
positive in this sub-sample. However, the methodology of backing out the discretionary 
accruals from earnings to calculate unmanaged earnings is not able to distinguish 
between the null hypotheses proposed and the presence of measurement error in 
discretionary accruals as shown in Elgers et al. (2003).   
 
((Table 16)) 
 
The results in table 16 indicate that group (ii) has a negative mean for both EDAC 
and EDACC. However, EDACC is able to eliminate some measurement error since its 
mean is lower than EDAC as shown in Panel B (–0.019 vs. –0.03). As for group (iii), 
mean EDAC and EDACC are both positive but EDACC has a lower mean (0.36 vs. 0.55). 
These results corroborate that the methodology used in DeFond and Park represents 
measurement error in discretionary accruals and shows that EDACC is able to eliminate 
some of this measurement error. 
 
4.3 Chapter Summary 
The empirical results of the study are presented in this chapter. Both the power 
(type II error) and specification of testing for EM are compared when using the 
discretionary accruals measure, EDAC, vs. when using the alternative discretionary 
accruals measure, EDACC. The results indicate that there is an improvement in power 
using EDACC for all samples in which there is added accrual manipulation (5%, 10%, and 
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20% manipulation). The improvement is proportional to the amount of manipulation i.e. 
the larger the manipulation, the more the improvement from using the alternative 
discretionary accruals measure. Also, there is more improvement when using more noisy 
methods to estimate discretionary accruals (Healy and DeAngelo methods) than when 
using less noisy methods (Jones and modified Jones). 
The results in the SEC litigation sample and debt-covenant violation sample are 
less significant, probably due to the small sample. However, there is incremental 
significance from using EDACC as shown by the significant coefficient on Log(RATIO) in 
the logistic regressions when using the modified Jones method. 
Results of the specification or specificity of the models show improvement in the 
rejection rates of the alternative hypotheses of income-increasing and income-decreasing 
EM in samples chosen from extreme income and cash from operations deciles. However, 
the rejection rates still exceed the test levels in most cases. 
Other samples used include noise samples chosen from extreme income deciles in 
which I replace discretionary accruals with random numbers with the same mean and 
standard deviation assuming a normal distribution. The results indicate a reduction in 
rejection rates from using the alternative discretionary accruals measure. 
Regressions of proxies of measurement error contained in discretionary accruals 
reveal that the alternative discretionary accruals measure reduces some of this 
measurement error. 
Overall, the results indicate that EDACC is an improvement in testing for EM in 
most samples. 
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Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusion 
Models for detecting EM set forth in the literature include simple models such as 
the Healy and DeAngelo models. Dechow et al. (1995) and others have shown the 
prevalence of measurement error in all models estimating non-discretionary accruals. I 
propose to separately estimate discretionary components of accruals (accounts receivable, 
inventories, accounts payable, other working capital and depreciation), and then measure 
the consistency between them. Any inconsistency is an indication of measurement error 
in the estimation models. This measurement error arises from misspecification of models 
estimating non-discretionary accruals and this carries onto the residual or discretionary 
accruals estimates.  
Chapter 2 shows that managers are expected to manipulate one or more 
component of accruals in the direction that affects income consistently. Thus, the signs 
and magnitude of the components of accruals are expected to provide incremental 
information over the magnitude of the aggregate discretionary accruals. Using the 
separate components of discretionary accruals, I propose a measure, RATIO, which 
captures the relationship between these components. High values of RATIO are 
associated with intentional EM whereas low values of RATIO represent misspecification 
in the discretionary accruals model used.  
I propose an alternative measure of discretionary accruals (EDACC), which is the 
product of RATIO and the traditional measure of discretionary accruals (EDAC using 
Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991) and modified Jones models (Dechow et al. 
(1995)). I expect that the EDACC will provide better results than EDAC in testing for EM 
in terms of the power and specification of the detection of EM. Furthermore, I expect the 
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improvement in testing for EM is higher when the models used to measure discretionary 
accruals are more misspecified such as the Healy and DeAngelo models. 
To test the improvement in the power using EDACC, I use three different samples 
with expectation of EM. The first is a random sample chosen from the full sample in 
which I add accrual manipulation to both accounts receivable and accounts payable. I use 
manipulation of 5%, 10% and 20%. Furthermore, I test the power of EDACC in a sample 
of firms targeted by the SEC for alleged fraud, and a sample of firms that violated their 
debt covenants. The results appearing in chapter 4 indicate that there is an improvement 
in power using EDAC for all samples in which there is added accrual manipulation (5%, 
10%, and 20% manipulation). The improvement is proportional to the amount of 
manipulation. Also, there is more improvement when using more noisy methods to 
estimate discretionary accruals (Healy and DeAngelo methods). The results in the SEC 
litigation sample and debt-covenant violation sample are less significant, probably due to 
the small sample. However, there is incremental significance from using EDACC as 
shown by the significant coefficient on Log(RATIO) in the logistic regressions. 
To test the specification of the tests using EDACC, I use three samples with no 
expectation of EM. First, I choose a random sample in which I add no manipulation. 
Next, I choose random samples from extreme income and cash from operations sub-
samples. Lastly, I use a random sample with added noise. 
Results of the specification or specificity of the models are less straightforward. 
There is some improvement in the rejection rates of the alternative hypotheses of income-
increasing and income-decreasing EM in the samples chosen from extreme income and 
cash from operations deciles. However, the improvements are not across the board and 
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are not enough to reduce the rejection rates to the expected rejection rates at the specific 
test levels. 
Other samples used include noise samples chosen from extreme income deciles in 
which I replace discretionary accruals with random numbers with the same mean and 
standard deviation assuming a normal distribution. The results indicate a reduction in 
rejection rates. 
Regressions of proxies of measurement error contained in discretionary accruals 
reveal that the alternative discretionary accruals measure reduces some of this 
measurement error. 
Overall, the results in the study indicate that EDACC is an improvement in testing 
for EM. The improvement in both power and specification, even though at times not 
significant, is an indication that it is important to consider the relationship between the 
specific components of discretionary accruals. 
Further research can be done in specific industries in which there is a prior 
expectation about which components are used to manipulate bottom-line income.  
The results may be tampered by the fact that some of the expectation models of 
the specific components of accruals do not capture the true nature of the component. For 
example, under the modified Jones methodology, non-discretionary accounts receivable 
is a function of change is sales less accounts receivables and the level of property, plant, 
and equipment, which is unlikely to capture this component. This is left as an avenue for 
future research. 
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Figure 1: Graphical Representation of Manipulation by Manager 
Using Two Components of Accruals (x1 and x2) Given a Deviation 
from Benchmark, D (All Remaining Factors are Constant): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen from the graphical representation, manipulation by the manager begins with only one 
component (x1) until the deviation from the benchmark reaches a certain level (A) after which both 
components are used in the manipulation. At the point B, the manipulation using both components cannot 
increase. In practice, this is probably the point where the decision to take a “Big Bath” is made. The above 
graphical representation assumes the only factor changing is the deviation D. 
c1 = Cost of manipulating x1, 
c2 = Cost of manipulating x2,  
T = Cost threshold acceptable to manager,  
D = Deviation of earnings from benchmark e.g. prior year earnings. 
This representation ignores the reversal of manipulation. The points between A and B are characterized by 
manipulation using both components.  
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Figure 2: Plot of EDAC against EDACC:  
 
 
 
 
 
EDACt = Discretionary accruals using modified Jones methodology 
RATIOt = Measure of magnitude of measurement error in components of discretionary accruals (close to 0 
when high measurement error and close to 1 when low measurement error) 
C
tEDAC = Alternative discretionary accruals = EDACt* RATIOt 
EDAC 
EDACC 
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Table 1: Industrial Sample Distribution: 
Two-digit SIC  
Code 
Industry N % 
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing  158 0.34 
10-17 Mining & Construction  2,444 5.22 
20-29 Manufacturing – Non-durables 8,055 17.22 
30-39 Manufacturing – Durables 16,078 34.37 
40-49 Transportation & Public Utilities 5,717 12.22 
50-51 Wholesale Trade 2,097 4.48 
52-59 Retail Trade 3,511 7.50 
70-89 Services 8,376 17.90 
99 Unidentified 347 0.74 
Total  46,783 100.00 
N = Number of observations in each industry; 
% = Percentage of observations in each industry relative to full sample. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample:  
(N = 46,783) Panel A: 
Variable 
 
Mean Std Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
TACt -0.047 0.097 -0.819 0.744 
INCt  -0.044 0.249 -2.191 0.400 
CFOt  0.003 0.237 -1.916 0.478 
DARt   0.018 0.067 -0.207 0.449 
DINVt   0.009 0.047 -0.166 0.286 
DAPt -0.013 0.058 -0.449 0.197 
DOWCt 0.0006 0.035 -0.216 0.187 
DEPt   -0.061 0.040 -0.333 -0.005 
At 1,007.60 2,834.44 0.100 54,548.00 
Modified 
Jones: 
    
EDACt -0.004 0.089 -0.778 0.754 
EDARt 0.002 0.060 -0.349 0.521 
EDINVt 0.001 0.042 -0.341 0.302 
EDAPt -0.0004 0.053 -0.446 0.294 
EDOWCt 0.0002 0.034 -0.215 0.215 
EDDEPt -0.007 0.034 -0.319 0.318 
RATIOt 0.454 0.294 0.000 1.000 
C
tEDAC  -0.004 0.068 -0.776 0.754 
TACt = -(DARt + DINVt + DAPt + DTAXt + DOTHt + DEPt)/At-1 
INCt = Income before extraordinary items  
CFOt  = INCt – TACt 
DARt  = Change in accounts receivable 
DINVt  = Change in inventory  
DAPt = -Change in accounts payable 
DOWCt = Change in other working capital accounts  
DEPt = -Depreciation from cash flow statement 
EDACt = Discretionary accruals using modified Jones methodology 
EDARt = Discretionary accounts receivable using modified Jones methodology 
EDINVt = Discretionary inventory using modified Jones methodology 
EDAPt = Discretionary accounts payable using modified Jones methodology 
EDOWCt = Discretionary other working capital using modified Jones methodology 
EDEPPt = Discretionary depreciation using modified Jones methodology 
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RATIOt = Measure of magnitude of measurement error in components of discretionary accruals (close to 0 
when high measurement error and close to 1 when low measurement error) 
C
tEDAC = Alternative discretionary accruals = EDACt* RATIOt 
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Panel B: Pearson Correlation Coefficients: 
 TACt INCt CFOt DARt  DINVt  DAPt  DOWCt  DEPt  EDACt   RATIOt CtEDAC  
TACt 
 
1.000 0.317* 
 
-0.078* 
 
0.513* 
 
0.487* 
 
0.190* 
 
0.327* 
 
0.442* 
 
0.891* 
 
-0.066* 
 
0.852* 
 
INCt 
 
 1.000 0.921* 
 
0.128* 
 
0.109* 
 
0.120* 
 
0.032* 
 
0.228* 
 
0.273* 
 
-0.063* 
 
0.271* 
 
CFOt 
 
  1.000 -0.076* 
 
-0.086* 
 
0.047* 
 
-0.101* 
 
0.057* 
 
-0.079* 
 
-0.039* 
 
-0.065* 
 
DARt 
   
   1.000 0.231* 
 
-0.416* 
 
-0.059* 
 
-0.046* 
 
0.479* 
 
-0.017* 
 
0.431* 
 
DINVt 
   
    1.000 -0.294* 
 
0.016** 
 
0.034* 
 
0.428* 
 
-0.014** 
 
0.385* 
 
DAPt        1.000 -0.007 0.070* 0.217* -0.028* 0.248* 
            
DOWCt         1.000 0.010
*** 0.340* -0.037* 0.333* 
            
DEPt 
 
       1.000 0.254* -0.043* 0.251* 
EDACt 
 
        1.000 -0.072* 0.955* 
      RATIOt          1.000 -0.088* 
* Significant at less than 0.001 
** Significant at 0.01 or less 
***Significant at 0.05 or less 
 
TACt = -(DARt + DINVt + DAPt + DTAXt + DOTHt + DEPt)/At-1 
INCt = Income before extraordinary items  
CFOt  = INCt – TACt 
DARt  = Change in accounts receivable 
DINVt  = Change in inventory  
DAPt = -Change in accounts payable 
DOWCt = Change in other working capital accounts  
DEPt = -Depreciation from cash flow statement 
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EDACt = Discretionary accruals using modified Jones methodology 
RATIOt = Measure of magnitude of measurement error in components of discretionary accruals (close to 0 when high measurement error and close to 1 when 
low measurement error)  
C
tEDAC = Alternative discretionary accruals = EDACt* RATIOt 
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Table 3: Results of Modified Jones Regressions of Components of 
Accruals: 
Mean (Std Deviation) of Coefficients and t-values 
Dep. 
Variable 
Intercept t-value DREVt-
DARt 
t-value PPE 
 
t-value R2 
DARt  0.149 
(0.537) 
0.834 
(1.966) 
0.058 
(0.051) 
3.449 
(3.247) 
0.013 
(0.024) 
1.161 
(1.520) 
0.225 
(0.144) 
 
DINVt  0.083 
(0.418) 
0.301 
(1.716) 
0.051 
(0.047) 
3.302 
(2.636) 
0.007 
(0.016) 
0.737 
(1.286) 
0.191 
(0.143) 
 
DAPt   -0.125 
(0.406) 
-1.283 
(2.328) 
-0.043 
(0.034) 
-2.903 
(2.860) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
-0.893 
(1.308) 
0.201 
(0.144) 
 
DOWCt   
 
0.019 
(0.285) 
-0.161 
(1.679) 
0.0007 
(0.021) 
0.041 
(1.598) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
0.450 
(1.190) 
0.078 
(0.093) 
 
DEPt -0.064 
(0.787) 
-1.850 
(3.129) 
-0.012 
(0.023) 
-1.385 
(1.757) 
-0.085 
(0.032) 
-21.127 
(12.865) 
0.833 
(0.111) 
 
TACt  0.063 
(1.208) 
-0.781 
(2.578) 
0.053 
(0.071) 
1.285 
(2.262) 
-0.070 
(0.045) 
-6.057 
(6.111) 
0.351 
  (0.194) 
TACt = -(DARt + DINVt + DAPt + DTAXt + DOTHt + DEPt)/At-1 
DARt  = Change in accounts receivable 
DINVt  = Change in inventory  
DAPt = -Change in accounts payable 
DOWCt = Change in other working capital accounts  
DEPt = -Depreciation from cash flow statement 
DREVt = Sales or revenues 
PPEt = Gross property, plant, and equipment 
The coefficients are from pooled regressions using the modified Jones methodology across four-digit SIC 
codes over the period 1989-2003: 
DARt/At-1 = a11 (1/At-1) + b11 (DREVt-ARt/At-1) + b21 (PPE/At-1) +EDARt 
DINVt/At-1 = a12 (1/At-1) + b12 (DREVt-ARt/At-1) + b22 (PPE/At-1) + EDINVt 
DAPt/At-1 = a13 (1/At-1) + b13 (DREVt-ARt/At-1) + b22 (PPE/At-1) + EDAPt 
DAPt/At-1 = a14 (1/At-1) + b14 (DREVt-ARt/At-1)  + b24 (PPE/At-1) + EDOWC t 
DEPt/At-1 = a15 (1/At-1) + b15(DREVt-ARt/At-1)  + b25 (PPEt/At-1) + EDDEPt 
TACt/At-1 = a16 (1/At-1) + b16 (DREVt-ARt/At-1) + b26 (PPE/At-1) +EDACt 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Components of Accruals by 
Industry: 
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) of Components of Accruals 
by Industry: 
Two-digit 
SIC Code 
N 
 
DARt DINVt DAPt DOWCt DEPt 
01-09a 158 0.008 
(0.036) 
 
0.017 
(0.039) 
-0.007 
(0.041) 
-0.001 
(0.025) 
-0.041 
(0.015) 
10-17b 2,444 0.010 
(0.055) 
 
0.004 
(0.031) 
-0.011 
(0.049) 
0.002 
(0.032) 
-0.086 
(0.056) 
20-29c 8,055 0.012 
(0.049) 
 
0.009 
(0.043) 
-0.011 
(0.049) 
0.002 
(0.031) 
-0.052 
(0.027) 
30-39d 16,078 0.018 
(0.071) 
 
0.012 
(0.058) 
-0.012 
(0.060) 
0.001 
(0.035) 
-0.054 
(0.032) 
40-49e 5,717 0.012 
(0.043) 
 
0.002 
(0.016) 
-0.011 
(0.043) 
0.001 
(0.027) 
-0.066 
(0.042) 
50-51f 2,097 0.026 
(0.074) 
 
0.018 
(0.065) 
-0.020 
(0.072) 
0.002 
(0.030) 
-0.037 
(0.029) 
52-59g 3,511 0.010 
(0.040) 
 
0.020 
(0.057) 
-0.018 
(0.054) 
0.001 
(0.031) 
-0.062 
(0.031) 
70-89h 8,376 0.032 
(0.090) 
 
0.002 
(0.029) 
-0.015 
(0.066) 
-0.003 
(0.045) 
-0.077 
(0.053) 
99i 347 0.014 
(0.086) 
 
0.006 
(0.051) 
-0.030 
(0.089) 
0.005 
(0.041) 
-0.064 
(0.050) 
All  46,783 0.018 
(0.067) 
0.009 
(0.047) 
-0.013 
(0.058) 
0.001 
(0.035) 
-0.061 
(0.040) 
aAgriculture, Forestry & Fishing 
bMining & Construction 
cManufacturing – Non-durables 
dManufacturing – Durables 
eTransportation & Public Utilities 
fWholesale Trade 
gRetail Trade 
hServices 
iUnidentified 
DARt  = Increase (Decrease) in accounts receivable 
DINVt  = Increase (Decrease) in inventory  
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DAPt = Decrease (Increase) in accounts payable 
DOWCt = Change in other working capital accounts  
DEPt = – Depreciation expense from cash flow statement  
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Panel B: Mean (Standard Deviation) of Balances of Components 
of Accruals by Industry:  
Two-digit 
SIC Code 
N 
 
ARt INVt APt OWCt DEPt 
01-09a 158 0.139 
(0.102) 
0.189 
(0.126) 
-0.067 
(0.059) 
-0.089 
(0.102) 
-0.041 
(0.015) 
10-17b 2,444 0.139 
(0.151) 
0.062 
(0.140) 
-0.094 
(0.093) 
-0.056 
(0.136) 
-0.086 
(0.056) 
20-29c 8,055 0.165 
(0.122) 
0.165 
(0.136) 
-0.095 
(0.078) 
-0.069 
(0.083) 
-0.052 
(0.027) 
30-39d 16,078 0.226 
(0.132) 
0.224 
(0.141) 
-0.107 
(0.088) 
-0.087 
(0.118) 
-0.054 
(0.032) 
40-49e 5,717 0.112 
(0.122) 
0.027 
(0.041) 
-0.070 
(0.089) 
-0.059 
(0.087) 
-0.066 
(0.042) 
50-51f 2,097 0.300 
(0.178) 
0.318 
(0.197) 
-0.216 
(0.153) 
-0.059 
(0.089) 
-0.037 
(0.029) 
52-59g 3,511 0.097 
(0.130) 
0.278 
(0.231) 
-0.143 
(0.102) 
-0.077 
(0.079) 
-0.062 
(0.031) 
70-89h 8,376 0.253 
(0.206) 
0.043 
(0.092) 
-0.089 
(0.106) 
-0.153 
(0.444) 
-0.077 
(0.053) 
99i 347 0.232 
(0.183) 
0.133 
(0.166) 
-0.135 
(0.148) 
-0.111 
(0.193) 
-0.064 
(0.050) 
All  46,783 0.195 
(0.160) 
0.157 
(0.166) 
-0.104 
(0.100) 
-0.089 
(0.212) 
-0.061 
(0.040) 
aAgriculture, Forestry & Fishing 
bMining & Construction 
cManufacturing – Non-durables 
dManufacturing – Durables 
eTransportation & Public Utilities 
fWholesale Trade 
gRetail Trade 
hServices 
iUnidentified 
 
ARt = Accounts receivable, 
INVt = Inventories, 
APt = Accounts payable, 
OWCt = Other working capital (other current assets minus other current liabilities), 
DEPt = Depreciation. 
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Table 5: Autocorrelation of Components of Accruals by Industry:  
Autocorrelation Coefficients (t-statistics) 
Two-digit 
SIC Code  
N 
 
DAR DINV DAP DOWC DEP 
01-09a 150 0.135 
(3.562) 
 
0.250 
(4.816) 
0.126 
(2.703) 
-2.233 
(-8.382) 
0.703 
(12.212) 
10-17b 2,294 -0.006 
(-1.281) 
 
0.052 
(5.436) 
-0.001 
(-0.442) 
-0.158 
(-7.794) 
0.004 
(2.914) 
20-29c 7,801 0.040 
(7.017) 
 
0.052 
(8.219) 
-0.008 
(-5.915) 
-0.540 
(-22.814) 
0.022 
(11.772) 
30-39d 15,757 0.000 
(0.049) 
 
0.001 
(1.616) 
0.001 
(1.299) 
-0.033 
(-10.316) 
0.001 
(4.594) 
40-49e 5,599 0.001 
(0.679) 
 
0.021 
(5.104) 
0.003 
(10.674) 
-0.429 
(-14.925) 
0.057 
(18.607) 
50-51f 2,048 0.095 
(8.148) 
 
0.015 
(3.686) 
0.001 
(0.168) 
-0.184 
(-8.087) 
0.180 
(21.238) 
52-59g 3,492 0.024 
(6.139) 
 
0.135 
(14.984) 
0.015 
(3.316) 
-0.127 
(-9.521) 
0.243 
(33.024) 
70-89h 8,262 0.002 
(3.763) 
 
0.012 
(4.114) 
0.001 
(1.872) 
-0.065 
(-10.532) 
0.002 
(6.260) 
99i 342 -0.001 
(-0.413) 
 
0.001 
(2.853) 
0.000 
(0.261) 
-0.262 
(-6.048) 
0.000 
(0.128) 
All  45,745* 0.002 
(5.199) 
0.001 
(5.747) 
0.001 
(5.291) 
-0.056 
(-21.582) 
0.002 
(12.529) 
aAgriculture, Forestry & Fishing 
bMining & Construction 
cManufacturing – Non-durables 
dManufacturing – Durables 
eTransportation & Public Utilities 
fWholesale Trade 
gRetail Trade 
hServices 
iUnidentified 
*Sample excludes observations with missing data in year t-1. 
Autocorrelation coefficients are the coefficients from the following regressions: 
1* -+=D tt ARbaAR  
1* -+=D tt APbaAP  
1* -+=D tt INVbaINV  
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1* -+=D tt OWCbaOWC  
1* -+= tt DEPbaDEP  
DARt  = Increase (Decrease) in accounts receivable 
DINVt  = Increase (Decrease) in inventory  
DAPt = Decrease (Increase) in accounts payable 
DOWCt = Change in other working capital accounts  
DEPt =  – Depreciation expense from cash flow statement  
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Table 6: Type of Manipulation in Firms Subject to SEC 
Enforcement Actions in the Period 2000-2004: 
N=133 firms 
Type of manipulation Number of firms 
Manipulation in only one component:  
Manipulation of revenues (premature recognition or fictitious sales 
or misclassification) 
 
56 
Manipulation of inventories (failure to write down inventory or 
misclassification) 
 
6 
Manipulation of expenses (capitalization of expenses or 
manipulation of reserves) 
 
25 
Manipulation of other income 
 
1 
Subtotal 88 
Manipulation in more than one component:  
Manipulation of revenues and inventories or expenses or 
depreciation  
 
39 
Manipulation of inventories or expenses or depreciation 
 
6 
Subtotal 
 
45 
 95
Table 7: Results of Tests of Earnings Management for Random Sample with Artificially 
Added Accrual Manipulation: 
Panel A: Mean (Std Deviation) of Regressions on PART: 
 5% Manipulation 10% Manipulation 20% Manipulation 
Dep. 
Variable 
PART Std Error t-value R2 PART Std Error t-value R2 PART Std Error t-value R2 
Healy:             
C
tEDAC  0.084 (0.070) 
0.046 
(0.035) 
2.287 
(1.604) 
4.17% 
(5.04%) 
0.123 
(0.086) 
0.046 
(0.036) 
3.359 
(2.285) 
7.79% 
(8.06%) 
0.241 
(0.148) 
0.054 
(0.040) 
5.608 
(3.540) 
17.45% 
(15.34%) 
Z-statistic   34.98    51.49    86.63  
C
tEDAC  0.062 (0.059) 
0.034 
(0.027) 
2.333 
(1.819) 
4.67% 
(6.46%) 
0.100 
(0.075) 
0.035 
(0.027) 
3.701 
(2.665) 
9.50% 
(10.62%) 
0.208 
(0.136) 
0.043 
(0.032) 
6.161 
(3.994) 
19.78% 
(17.72%) 
Z-statistic 
DeAngelo: 
  35.68    56.72    95.15  
EDACt 0.092 
(0.399) 
0.111 
(0.241) 
1.327 
(1.642) 
2.46% 
(6.02%) 
0.131 
(0.403) 
0.112 
(0.241) 
2.044 
(2.131) 
4.32% 
(7.32%) 
0.239 
(0.161) 
0.112 
(0.207) 
3.925 
(3.215) 
11.32% 
(12.36%) 
Z-statistic   20.32    31.33    60.61  
C
tEDAC  0.067 (0.283) 
0.074 
(0.151) 
1.415 
(1.792) 
2.78% 
(6.59%) 
0.101 
(0.288) 
0.074 
(0.151) 
2.283 
(2.435) 
5.29% 
(8.29%) 
0.203 
(0.144) 
0.075 
(0.113) 
4.496 
(3.560) 
13.84% 
(15.52%) 
Z-statistic 
Jones: 
  21.66    34.99    69.43  
EDACt 0.083 
(0.060) 
0.041 
(0.032) 
2.492 
(1.615) 
4.69% 
(5.47%) 
0.119 
(0.077) 
0.042 
(0.032) 
3.577 
(2.033) 
8.55% 
(8.63%) 
0.220 
(0.132) 
0.049 
(0.036) 
5.518 
(3.289) 
17.10% 
(14.39%) 
Z-statistic   38.11    54.82    85.24  
C
tEDAC  0.062 (0.052) 
0.031 
(0.024) 
2.517 
(1.837) 
5.17% 
(7.13%) 
0.098 
(0.068) 
0.032 
(0.025) 
3.901 
(2.689) 
10.22% 
(11.30%) 
0.184 
(0.119) 
0.039 
(0.029) 
5.817 
(3.570) 
18.49% 
(16.23%) 
Z-statistic   38.48    59.78    89.86  
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Table 7: Continued 
Modified 
Jones: 
            
EDACt 0.085 
(0.062) 
0.042 
(0.033) 
2.485 
(1.610) 
4.67% 
(5.46%) 
0.122 
(0.079) 
0.043 
(0.033) 
3.565 
(2.300) 
8.52% 
(8.62%) 
0.222 
(0.134) 
0.050 
(0.037) 
5.455 
(3.294) 
16.83% 
(14.30%) 
Z-statistic   38.00    54.63    84.28  
C
tEDAC  0.063 (0.053) 
0.032 
(0.025) 
2.515 
(1.843) 
5.17% 
(7.16%) 
0.099 
(0.069) 
0.033 
(0.025) 
3.906 
(2.701) 
10.24% 
(11.37%) 
0.186 
(0.121) 
0.040 
(0.029) 
5.772 
(3.587) 
18.28% 
(16.18%) 
Z-statistic   38.45    59.85    89.17  
PART = Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 in the test observations (with added accrual manipulation) and 0 otherwise 
EDACt = Discretionary accruals  
C
tEDAC = Alternative discretionary accruals = EDACt* RATIOt 
The results are from the regressions over four-digit SIC codes: 
 EDACt = a + b* PARTt + et 
C
tEDAC  = a1 + b1* PARTt + e1t 
å
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1  
Where ti = t-statistic for industry i (four-digit SIC code), 
k i = Degrees of freedom for t-statistic of industry i, 
N = Total number of industries in regressions. 
The accrual manipulation is added to 1000 firm-year observations chosen randomly from the sample, with EDAC greater than zero to minimize 
dilution of manipulation. 
20% manipulation is achieved by 16% manipulation of accounts receivable (and revenue) and 4% to accounts payable. 
10% manipulation is achieved by 5% manipulation of accounts receivable (and revenue) and 5% to accounts payable. 
5% manipulation is achieved by 2% manipulation of accounts receivable (and revenue) and 3% to accounts payable. 
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Panel B: Results of Logistic Regression for Random Sample with 
Artificially Added Accrual Manipulation: 
Coefficient (Chi-square value) (p-value) 
Dependent 
Variable 
    Intercept Log(EDACt) Log(RATIOt) Likelihood 
Ratio 
5% 
Manipulation: 
PART  
 
-0.415 
(14.397) 
(<.0001) 
 
0.675 
(198.090) 
(<.0001) 
 
1.144 
(169.114) 
(<.0001) 
 
1094.932 
10% 
Manipulation: 
PART 
 
1.522 
(154.035) 
(<.0001) 
 
1.460 
(586.091) 
(<.0001) 
 
1.943 
(236.503) 
(<.0001) 
 
2306.113 
20% 
Manipulation: 
PART 
 
5.312 
(847.736) 
(<.0001) 
 
4.425 
(1127.103) 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.759 
(25.467) 
(<.0001) 
 
4515.147 
The results are for the pooled logistic regression: 
PARTt = c + d*Log( EDACt) + f* Log(RATIOt) + et 
EDACt and RATIOt are calculated using the modified Jones method. 
The accrual manipulation is added to 1000 firm-year observations chosen randomly from the sample, with EDAC 
greater than zero to minimize dilution of manipulation. 
20% manipulation is achieved by 16% manipulation of accounts receivable (and revenue) and 4% to accounts payable. 
10% manipulation is achieved by 5% manipulation of accounts receivable (and revenue) and 5% to accounts payable. 
5% manipulation is achieved by 2% manipulation of accounts receivable (and revenue) and 3% to accounts payable. 
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Table 8: Results of Tests of Earnings Management for Firms 
Subject to SEC Litigation:   
Panel A: Mean (Std Deviation) of Regressions on PART:  N = 19 
Firms, N = 249 Observations 
Dependent 
Variable 
PART Std. Error t-value R2 
Healy:     
EDACt 0.025 
(0.093) 
0.097 
(0.070) 
0.575 
(0.844) 
8.71% 
(9.08%) 
Z-statistic   2.215  
C
tEDAC  0.018 
(0.067) 
0.069 
(0.051) 
0.588 
(0.911) 
9.76% 
(13.83%) 
Z-statistic   2.316  
DeAngelo:     
EDACt -0.006 
(0.149) 
0.139 
(0.115) 
0.211 
(1.279) 
10.95% 
(14.93%) 
Z-statistic   0.793  
C
tEDAC  0.003 
(0.085) 
0.091 
(0.081) 
0.207 
(1.060) 
8.57% 
(12.09%) 
Z-statistic 
Jones: 
  0.938  
EDACt 0.020 
(0.111) 
0.094 
(0.066) 
0.492 
(1.000) 
9.45% 
(11.47%) 
Z-statistic   2.076  
C
tEDAC  0.020 
(0.097) 
0.069 
(0.052) 
0.584 
(1.276) 
10.78% 
(17.08%) 
Z-Statistic 
Modified 
Jones: 
  2.422  
EDACt 0.019 
(0.110) 
0.097 
(0.071) 
0.499 
(0.959) 
9.11% 
(10.62%) 
Z-statistic   1.950  
C
tEDAC  
 
Z-statistic 
0.019 
(0.096) 
0.070 
(0.056) 
0.593 
(1.215) 
2.454 
11.09% 
(16.15%) 
 
PART = Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 in the test observations (with added accrual 
manipulation) and 0 otherwise. 
EDACt = Discretionary accruals  
C
tEDAC = Alternative discretionary accruals = EDACt* RATIOt 
The results are from firm regressions with 10 or more observations: 
 EDACit = a + b* PARTit + eit 
C
itEDAC  = a1 + b1* PARTit + e1it 
å
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Where ti = t-statistic for industry i (four-digit SIC code), 
k i = Degrees of freedom for t-statistic of industry i, 
N = Total number of industries in regressions. 
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Panel B: Results of Logistic Regression for Firms Subject to SEC 
Litigation: Coefficient (Chi-square value) (p-value), N = 130 
observations  
Dependent 
Variable 
 Intercept Log(EDACt) Log(RATIOt) Likelihood 
Ratio 
PART -2.044 
(7.898) 
(0.005) 
-0.438 
(2.152) 
(0.142) 
0.771 
(4.183) 
(0.041) 
4.771 
The results are for the pooled logistic regression: 
PARTt = c + d*Log( EDACt) + f* Log(RATIOt) + et 
EDACt and RATIOt are calculated using the modified Jones method. 
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Table 9: Results of Tests of Earnings Management for Sample with 
Debt Covenant Violation in Year 0 and –1:  
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) of Regressions on PART: N = 
13 Firms, N = 161 Observations  
Dependent 
Variable 
PART Std. Error t-value R2 
Healy:     
EDACt -0.043 
(0.081) 
0.106 
(0.084) 
-0.532 
(0.494) 
4.41% 
(5.46%) 
Z-statistic   -1.729  
C
tEDAC  -0.020 
(0.052) 
0.066 
(0.050) 
-0.412 
(0.536) 
3.84% 
(5.05%) 
Z-statistic 
DeAngelo: 
  -1.131  
EDACt -0.031 
(0.065) 
0.155 
(0.141) 
-0.350 
(0.509) 
3.28% 
(3.93%) 
Z-statistic   -0.886  
C
tEDAC  
 
-0.014 
(0.054) 
0.114 
(0.114) 
-0.212 
(0.519) 
2.71% 
(4.36%) 
Z-statistic   -0.714  
Jones:     
EDACt -0.025 
(0.060) 
0.080 
(0.045) 
-0.331 
(0.806) 
6.05% 
(5.95%) 
Z-statistic   -1.321  
C
tEDAC  -0.013 
(0.042) 
0.056 
(0.039) 
-0.196 
(0.879) 
6.43% 
(5.87%) 
Z-statistic 
Modified 
Jones: 
  -0.938  
EDACt -0.031 
(0.064) 
0.086 
(0.050) 
-0.305 
(0.748) 
5.37% 
(5.70%) 
Z-statistic   -0.722   
C
tEDAC  -0.015 
(0.045) 
0.056 
(0.040) 
-0.196 
(0.841) 
5.92% 
(6.33%) 
Z-statistic   -0.854  
PART = Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 in the year of violation and year prior to violation and 
0 otherwise. 
EDACt = Discretionary accruals  
C
tEDAC = Alternative discretionary accruals = EDACt* RATIOt 
The results are from firm regressions with 10 or more observations: 
 EDACt = a + b* PARTt + et 
C
tEDAC  = a1 + b1* PARTt + e1t 
å
= -
=-
N
i ii
i
kk
t
N
statisticZ
1 )2/(
1  
 102
Where ti = t-statistic for industry i (four-digit SIC code), 
k i = Degrees of freedom for t-statistic of industry i, 
N = Total number of industries in regressions. 
 
 
Panel B: Results of Logistic Regression for Sample with Debt 
Covenant Violation in Year 0 and –1: N = 79 Observations 
Coefficient (Chi-square value) (p-value) 
Dependent 
Variable 
    Intercept Log(EDACt) Log(RATIOt) Likelihood 
Ratio 
PART -3.398 
(8.987) 
(0.003) 
-1.220 
(6.180) 
(0.013) 
1.487 
(5.971) 
(0.015) 
8.219 
 
 
The results are for the pooled logistic regression: 
PARTt = c + d*Log( EDACt) + f* Log(RATIOt) + et 
EDACt and RATIOt are calculated using the modified Jones method. 
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Table 10: 2X2 Chi Square Comparison of Violation vs. Non-
Violation Periods with Values of RATIO Above and Below the 
Median: 
Actual Frequency (Expected Frequency)  
Dependent Variable 
 
RATIO > Median RATIO < Median Total 
Non-Violation 
Periods 
55 
(60.79) 
55 
(49.21) 
110 
Violation Periods 
(Year 0 and –1) 
29 
(23.21) 
13 
(18.79) 
42 
Total 84 68 152 
Median RATIO is based violation period observations only and is measured by firm. 
Chi-square value of table = 4.460, which is significant at 5% level. 
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Table 11: Rejection Rates of Null Hypothesis of No EM against 
Alternative Hypotheses of Positive and Negative EM in Random 
Sample with No Expectation of Earnings Management: 
Mean (median) of 10 iterations 
Alternative Hypothesis Earnings management >0 Earnings management <0 
 5% 1% 5% 1% 
Healy: 
EDACt 
 
5.00% 
(4.67%) 
 
1.38% 
(1.39%) 
 
5.18% 
(5.44%) 
 
1.88% 
(1.80%) 
C
tEDAC  4.84% 
(4.48%) 
2.05% 
(1.97%) 
5.42% 
(5.76%) 
2.27% 
(2.42%) 
DeAngelo:     
EDACt 3.52% 
(2.94%) 
1.19% 
(1.00%) 
4.37% 
(4.55%) 
1.89% 
(1.81%) 
C
tEDAC  3.72% 
(3.30%) 
1.66% 
(1.73%) 
4.25% 
(4.49%) 
2.24% 
(1.98%) 
Jones:     
EDACt 4.91% 
(4.27%) 
1.69% 
(1.75%) 
5.10% 
(4.74%) 
1.73% 
(1.75%) 
C
tEDAC  4.71% 
(4.55%) 
2.00% 
(2.02%) 
5.70% 
(5.33%) 
2.12% 
(2.01%) 
Modified 
Jones: 
    
EDACt 5.11% 
(4.94%) 
1.61% 
(1.62%) 
5.02% 
(4.46%) 
1.69% 
(1.59%) 
C
tEDAC  4.84% 
(4.36%) 
2.19% 
(2.20%) 
5.70% 
(5.44%) 
2.12% 
(1.95%) 
PART = Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 in the test observations (random sample of 1000 
observations) and 0 otherwise. 
EDACt = Discretionary accruals  
C
tEDAC = Alternative discretionary accruals = EDACt* RATIOt 
The rejection rates represent percentage of regressions in which the variable PART is significant at the 
above levels. These regressions are over four-digit SIC codes: 
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 EDACt = a + b* PARTt + et 
C
tEDAC  = a1 + b1* PARTt + e1t 
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Table 12: Rejection Rates of Null Hypothesis of No EM against 
Alternative Hypotheses of Positive and Negative EM in Random 
Sample Chosen from Extreme Income Deciles:  
Panel A: Lowest Decile of Income: Mean (Median) of 10 Iterations 
Alternative Hypothesis Earnings management >0 Earnings management <0 
 5% 1% 5% 1% 
Healy: 
EDACt 
 
2.47% 
(2.80%) 
 
1.08% 
(0.93%) 
 
47.75% 
(48.72%) 
 
32.46% 
(32.16%) 
C
tEDAC  1.83% 
(1.89%) 
0.38% 
(0.61%) 
46.81% 
(46.58%) 
32.19% 
(31.76%) 
DeAngelo:     
EDACt 10.37% 
(10.13%) 
7.59% 
(6.96%) 
21.50% 
(21.02%) 
14.42% 
(14.78%) 
C
tEDAC  8.14% 
(7.03%) 
6.24% 
(6.38%) 
21.90% 
(21.22%) 
14.38% 
(14.15%) 
Jones:     
EDACt 2.34% 
(2.55%) 
0.82% 
(0.93%) 
41.32% 
(42.06%) 
26.37% 
(25.95%) 
C
tEDAC  1.52% 
(1.25%) 
0.64% 
(0.63%) 
38.76% 
(39.38%) 
26.21% 
(25.88%) 
Modified 
Jones: 
    
EDACt 2.27% 
(2.48%) 
0.82% 
(0.93%) 
40.95% 
(41.14%) 
26.82% 
(26.67%) 
C
tEDAC  1.65% 
(1.83%) 
0.64% 
(0.63%) 
39.78% 
(40.51%) 
27.35% 
(27.83%) 
PART = Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 in the test observations (random sample from lowest 
decile of income) and 0 otherwise. 
EDACt = Discretionary accruals  
C
tEDAC = Alternative discretionary accruals = EDACt* RATIOt 
The rejection rates represent percentage of regressions in which the variable PART is significant at the above 
levels. These regressions are over four-digit SIC codes: 
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 EDACt = a + b* PARTt + et 
C
tEDAC  = a1 + b1* PARTt + e1t 
 
Panel B: Highest Decile of Income: 
Mean (Median) of 10 Iterations 
Alternative Hypothesis        Earnings management >0            Earnings management <0 
                                             5%                            1%                         5%                     1% 
Healy: 
EDACt 
 
24.02% 
(23.58%) 
 
13.45% 
(13.11%) 
 
1.43% 
(1.37%) 
 
0.51% 
(0.46%) 
C
tEDAC  20.54% 
(19.45%) 
11.20% 
(10.88%) 
1.30% 
(1.19%) 
0.60% 
(0.47%) 
DeAngelo:     
EDACt 7.05% 
(6.71%) 
2.86% 
(2.76%) 
2.98% 
(2.82%) 
1.49% 
(1.34%) 
C
tEDAC  7.00% 
(6.38%) 
3.31% 
(3.54%) 
2.89% 
(2.83%) 
1.58% 
(1.57%) 
Jones:     
EDACt 16.02% 
(14.83%) 
6.98% 
(6.85%) 
2.73% 
(2.84%) 
0.74% 
(0.49%) 
C
tEDAC  14.44% 
(13.84%) 
7.35% 
(7.59%) 
2.88% 
(3.17%) 
1.30% 
(1.17%) 
Modified 
Jones: 
    
EDACt 19.53% 
(19.42%) 
8.93% 
(8.56%) 
2.18% 
(2.29%) 
0.61% 
(0.49%) 
C
tEDAC  17.52% 
(16.44%) 
8.69% 
(9.15%) 
2.13% 
(2.07%) 
0.93% 
(0.92%) 
PART = Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 in the test observations (random sample from highest 
decile of income) and 0 otherwise. 
EDACt = Discretionary accruals  
C
tEDAC = Alternative discretionary accruals = EDACt* RATIOt 
 108
The rejection rates represent percentage of regressions in which the variable PART is significant at the above 
levels. These regressions are over four-digit SIC codes: 
 EDACt = a + b* PARTt + et 
C
tEDAC  = a1 + b1* PARTt + e1t 
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Table 13: Rejection Rates of Null Hypothesis of No EM against 
Alternative Hypotheses of Positive and Negative EM in Random 
Sample Chosen from Extreme Cash from Operations Deciles: 
Panel A: Lowest Decile of Cash from Operations: Mean (Median) 
of 10 Iterations 
Alternative Hypothesis Earnings management >0 Earnings management <0 
 5% 1% 5% 1% 
Healy: 
EDACt 
 
16.37% 
(16.82%) 
 
10.55% 
(10.72%) 
 
16.39% 
(16.79%) 
 
9.06% 
(9.23%) 
C
tEDAC  14.37% 
(14.42%) 
9.21% 
(9.35%) 
16.32% 
(16.51%) 
9.18% 
(9.88%) 
DeAngelo:     
EDACt 17.70% 
(17.58%) 
11.17% 
(11.53%) 
10.79% 
(10.38%) 
7.48% 
(7.30%) 
C
tEDAC  16.48% 
(16.82%) 
10.96% 
(11.22%) 
10.72% 
(10.70%) 
6.62% 
(6.44%) 
Jones:     
EDACt 16.55% 
(16.21%) 
9.83% 
(10. 42%) 
13.88% 
(14.11%) 
6.75% 
(7.05%) 
C
tEDAC  14.51% 
(14.41%) 
9.53% 
(9.96%) 
12.49% 
(13.06%) 
7.12% 
(7.23%) 
Modified 
Jones: 
    
EDACt 16.67% 
(16.82%) 
9.70% 
(10.26%) 
13.99% 
(14.11%) 
6.75% 
(7.14%) 
C
tEDAC  14.87% 
(14.94%) 
8.84% 
(9.01%) 
13.17% 
(14.24%) 
7.00% 
(6.69%) 
PART = Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 in the test observations (random sample from lowest 
decile of CFO) and 0 otherwise. 
EDACt = Discretionary accruals  
C
tEDAC = Alternative discretionary accruals = EDACt* RATIOt 
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The rejection rates represent percentage of regressions in which the variable PART is significant at the 
above levels. These regressions are over four-digit SIC codes: 
 EDACt = a + b* PARTt + et 
C
tEDAC  = a1 + b1* PARTt + e1t 
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Panel B: Highest Decile of Cash from Operations: 
Mean (Median) of 10 Iterations 
Alternative Hypothesis Earnings management >0 Earnings management <0 
 5% 1% 5% 1% 
Healy: 
EDACt 
 
0.24% 
(0.00%) 
 
0.04% 
(0.00%) 
 
33.26% 
(34.10%) 
 
15.50% 
(15.81%) 
C
tEDAC  0.14% 
(0.00%) 
0.00% 
(0.00%) 
30.59% 
(30.40%) 
16.00% 
(16.13%) 
DeAngelo:     
EDACt 0.46% 
(0.46%) 
0.14% 
(0.00%) 
14.84% 
(14.48%) 
6.58% 
(5.95%) 
C
tEDAC  0.59% 
(0.46%) 
0.32% 
(0.22%) 
15.86% 
(15.37%) 
8.29% 
(7.55%) 
Jones:     
EDACt 0.32% 
(0.45%) 
0.09% 
(0.00%) 
37.77% 
(37.36%) 
20.05% 
(19.19%) 
C
tEDAC  0.23% 
(0.22%) 
0.09% 
(0.00%) 
35.33% 
(34.47%) 
20.49% 
(20.64%) 
Modified 
Jones: 
    
EDACt 0.37% 
(0.45%) 
0.14% 
(0.00%) 
35.74% 
(35.80%) 
17.14% 
(16.75%) 
C
tEDAC  0.24% 
(0.00%) 
0.09% 
(0.00%) 
32.86% 
(32.95%) 
18.70% 
(18.47%) 
PART = Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 in the test observations (random sample from highest 
decile of CFO) and 0 otherwise. 
EDACt = Discretionary accruals  
C
tEDAC = Alternative discretionary accruals = EDACt* RATIOt 
The rejection rates represent percentage of regressions in which the variable PART is significant at the 
above levels. These regressions are over four-digit SIC codes: 
 EDACt = a + b* PARTt + et 
C
tEDAC  = a1 + b1* PARTt + e1t 
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Table 14: Results of Tests of Earnings Management in Random 
Sample vs. Noise Sample Chosen from Extreme Income Deciles: 
Mean (Median) of 10 Iterations 
Alternative Hypothesis Earnings management >0 Earnings management <0 
 5% 1% 5% 1% 
Random Sample from Lowest Decile of Income: 
EDACt 2.48% 
(3.09%) 
1.13% 
(1.28%) 
41.20% 
(40.82%) 
26.20% 
(26.10%) 
C
tEDAC  2.36% 
(1.94%) 
0.88% 
(0.65%) 
39.63% 
(39.87%) 
25.39% 
(24.84%) 
Noise Sample from Lowest Decile of Income: 
EDACt 5.68% 
(5.66%) 
3.42% 
(3.58%) 
40.87% 
(40.16%) 
27.17% 
(27.53%) 
C
tEDAC  4.89% 
(5.20%) 
3.11% 
(3.26%) 
35.46% 
(35.20%) 
25.06% 
(24.37%) 
Random Sample from Highest Decile of Income: 
EDACt 18.80% 
(18.46%) 
9.05% 
(8.95%) 
1.85% 
(1.84%) 
0.69% 
(0.48%) 
C
tEDAC  16.70% 
(16.21%) 
8.68% 
(8.74%) 
2.08% 
(1.86%) 
0.92% 
(0.69%) 
Noise Sample from Highest Decile of Income: 
EDACt 27.30% 
(27.18%) 
16.40% 
(16.16%) 
6.17% 
(5.88%) 
3.25% 
(3.27%) 
C
tEDAC  25.70% 
(25.48%) 
16.19% 
(15.94%) 
5.42% 
(5.20%) 
3.39% 
(3.25%) 
Random sample of 1000 observations are chosen from full sample without replacement. 
Noise sample of 1000 observations are the observations in the random sample in which I replace the 
discretionary accruals components artificially changed with same mean and variance as random sample.  
PART = Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 in the test observations and 0 otherwise 
EDACt = Discretionary accruals using modified Jones method 
C
tEDAC = Alternative discretionary accruals = EDACt* RATIOt 
The results are from the regressions over two-digit SIC codes: 
 EDACt = a + b* PARTt + et 
C
tEDAC  = a1 + b1* PARTt + e1t 
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Table 15: Results of Regressions on Proxies of Measurement 
Error: 
Mean Coefficients (t-Values) 
Dep. 
Variable 
Intercept CFO Growth  Intensity Life R2 
Healy: 
EDACt 
 
-0.004 
(0.169) 
 
-0.232 
(-3.867) 
 
0.028 
(1.944) 
 
-0.166 
(-2.492) 
 
-0.004 
(-2.388) 
 
31.84% 
 
C
tEDAC  -0.002 
(0.226) 
-0.161 
(-3.448) 
0.018 
(1.617) 
-0.125 
(-2.440) 
-0.003 
(-2.284) 
29.22% 
 
DeAngelo
: 
EDACt 
 
-0.009 
(-0.299) 
 
-0.397 
(-2.181) 
 
0.031 
(0.733) 
 
-0.068 
(-0.042) 
 
-0.005 
(-0.436) 
 
13.99% 
 
C
tEDAC  -0.003 
(-0.245) 
-0.262 
(-2.151) 
0.021 
(0.717) 
-0.042 
(-0.101) 
-0.003 
(-0.450) 
13.45% 
 
Jones: 
EDACt 
 
-0.039 
(-1.855) 
 
-0.219 
(-3.905) 
 
0.017 
(1.266) 
 
-0.059 
(-0.757) 
 
-0.005 
(-3.302) 
 
27.76% 
 
C
tEDAC  -0.030 
(-1.859) 
-0.155 
(-3.609) 
0.012 
(1.165) 
-0.044 
(-0.732) 
-0.004 
(-3.225) 
26.27% 
 
Modified 
Jones: 
EDACt 
 
-0.038 
(-1.752) 
 
-0.225 
(-3.919) 
 
0.023 
(1.748) 
 
-0.067 
(-0.855) 
 
-0.005 
(-3.179) 
 
27.95% 
 
C
tEDAC  -0.030 
(-1.765) 
-0.158 
(-3.598) 
0.016 
(1.580) 
-0.049 
(-0.819) 
-0.004 
(-3.112) 
26.26% 
The results are from regressions over four-digit SIC codes: 
EDACt = a + b*CFOt + c*Growtht + d*Intensityt + e*Life t + et 
C
tEDAC  = a1 + b1*CFOt + c1*Growtht + d1*Intensityt + e1*Life t + e1t 
CFOt = Cash from operations in year t, 
Growtht = DRevenuet / Revenuet-1, 
Intensityt = Gross PPEt / A t, 
Lifet = PPEt / DEPt. 
EDACt = Discretionary accruals  
C
tEDAC = Alternative discretionary accruals = EDACt* RATIOt 
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Table 16: Panel A: Discretionary Accruals (EDAC) and Alternative 
Discretionary Accruals (EDACC) Partitioned by Current Relative 
Performance and Expected Relative Performance: 
Panel A: Discretionary Accruals (EDAC): 
Current Relative Performance 
 Poor Good All 
Expected Future Relative Performance 
Poor 
Mean 
Median 
N 
(i) 
0.007 
0.006 
2512 
(ii) 
-0.032 
-0.022 
1221 
 
-0.005 
-0.003 
3733 
    
Good 
Mean 
Median 
N 
(iii) 
0.055 
0.035 
1221 
(iv) 
-0.010 
-0.007 
2842 
 
0.009 
0.005 
4063 
    
All 
Mean 
Median 
N 
 
0.023 
0.016 
3733 
 
-0.017 
-0.012 
4063 
 
0.002 
0.0009 
7796 
 
 
Panel B: Alternative Discretionary Accruals (EDACC): 
Current Relative Performance 
 Poor Good All 
Expected Future Relative Performance 
Poor 
Mean 
Median 
N 
(i) 
0.002 
0.0001 
2619 
(ii) 
-0.019 
-0.005 
1114 
 
-0.004 
-0.0002 
3733 
    
Good 
Mean 
Median 
N 
(iii) 
0.036 
0.013 
1112 
(iv) 
-0.005 
-0.0001 
2951 
 
0.006 
0.0005 
4063 
    
All 
Mean 
Median 
N 
 
0.012 
0.002 
3731 
 
-0.008 
-0.0007 
4065 
 
0.0012 
0.000 
7796 
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In Panel A, EDACt are calculated using modified Jones method. 
“Good” current relative performance is where unmanaged earnings (Inct – EDACt) are greater than or equal 
to two-digit SIC code median unmanaged earnings in year t. 
“Poor” current relative earnings performance is where unmanaged earnings (Inct – EDACt) is less than two-
digit SIC code median unmanaged earnings in year t. 
“Good” expected future relative performance is where earnings forecasts (I/B/E/S consensus of earnings in 
year t+1 measured as of March in year t+1 lagged by total assets) are greater than or equal to two-digit SIC 
code median earnings forecasts. 
“Poor” expected future relative performance is where earnings forecasts (I/B/E/S consensus of earnings in 
year t+1 measured as of March in year t+1 lagged by total assets) are less than two-digit SIC code median 
earnings forecasts. 
 
In Panel B, C
tEDAC  are calculated using modified Jones method. 
“Good” current relative performance is where unmanaged earnings (Inct – CtEDAC ) are greater than or equal 
to two-digit SIC code median unmanaged earnings in year t. 
“Poor” current relative performance is where unmanaged earnings (Inct – CtEDAC ) are less than two-digit 
SIC code median unmanaged earnings in year t. 
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